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8 Conclusion Lessons Learned about the Use and Abuse of Strategic Defenses WHEN HEARING ABOUT THE BOOK TOPIC, people often ask whether a particular barrier was effective. While this is an understandable query, it is not a particularly constructive one. It is striking that for each of the six cases, plausible arguments could be generated for the strategic defenses being both failures and successes. Although more difficult for some cases than others, this situation highlights the problematic nature of rendering absolute verdicts. Rather than selectively employing facts and developments to construct such an overall judgment , this concluding chapter presents some common findings from the cases concerning when and how strategic defenses contributed to as well as undermined security. Answering these basic questions provides a way to consider the potential merit of future efforts and to identify the requirements to optimize their effectiveness, especially over time. Despite the six cases spanning almost twenty-five hundred years, occurring in varied offense–defense technological balances, facing adversaries with diverse military and political capabilities, and operating under alternative regime types, common effects are evident. The variety of the cases and limited information on decision making, especially in the early cases, advises against generating a formal “theory of walls,” but they do allow some basic observations for the three dimensions of strategic defense raised in the introduction. First, how do such barriers influence adversary threat perceptions and behavior? This issue provides insights into the critical questions of dissuasion and deterrence. Second, to what extent do strategic defenses alter the military balance in the immediate and longer term? This assessment must extend beyond their direct effects to consider the broader impact on generating military power and safeguarding the nation. Finally, in what ways do strategic defenses influence subsequent leadership and popular attitudes as well as policy choices in the building state? Given that barriers alone do not resolve the underlying adversarial relationships, their effects on internal behavior greatly shape whether these structures contribute to or hamper security. Conclusion 309 When considering barrier effects for the three dimensions, it is important to appreciate the tendency to erect strategic defenses after an adversarial relationship is well established. Decision makers usually demonstrate some reluctance to construct fortification systems, especially as the focus of frontier policy. Prowall advocates clearly are present throughout in the cases, but their lobbying efforts usually take time to achieve fruition given barriers’ inability to eliminate an adversary’s strength or its hostility. A willingness to adopt a major work only tends to emerge after alternative courses of action appear to be problematic on political or policy grounds. Faced with an inability to pursue a viable offensive or accommodation, the logic of strategic defense becomes more appealing to enable these other approaches or, more often, to “buy time” for a subsequent change in strategic context. Even though leaders sometimes adopt heightened confidence in barriers upon deciding to erect such fortifications, it is critical to be conscious of the challenging security environment faced by political leaders and military commanders at the time. It is under such circumstances that officials are inclined to judge the effectiveness of strategic defenses rather than abstract notions of performance. Operating with detached perspective, we can gain a better understanding of the actual context and merit of fortifications, but sensitivity to the perceived pressures affecting policy choice is necessary when drawing lessons because future decision makers will likely operate with similar stresses. To assist in the forthcoming discussion of barrier effects, table 8.1 briefly summarizes the primary attributes and basic effects of each system covered in the study. Lessons Learned Exploration of these cases illustrates that the effects of strategic defenses on the adversary, military balance, and internal dimensions are clearly interconnected. The impressions on adversary and internal perspectives are significantly shaped by a strategic defense system’s impact on the military balance. Likewise, a barrier ’s influence on the military balance, especially beyond the period of initial construction, is tied to adversary and internal reactions to the fortifications. During the following discussion, some of the most explicit linkages across dimensions will be addressed, but they are generally considered apart to highlight the manner and degree to which strategic defenses influence each facet. Barrier Effects on Adversary Perceptions A rival’s reaction to construction of a strategic defense system depends on the rival leadership’s understanding of what that barrier signals about intentions and how the barrier alters relative capabilities. The two elements tend to be (text continues on p. 314) [18...

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