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12. The Consistent Ethic of Life: Is There a Historical Soft Underbelly?
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Chapter 12 The Consistent Ethic of Life: Is There a Historical Soft Underbelly? I am very grateful to Cardinal Bernardin for havingpicked the "consistent ethic of life" as the theme around which he has developed so many of his rich presentations since the Gannon and Wade lectures. Cardinal Bernardin has made points that are, in my judgment, utterly essential if the moral vision that is the "consistent ethic of life" is to shape not only an ecclesial consensus, but public policy. For instance, he repeatedly grounds this ethic in the dignity of the human person. He sees it applicable to lifeenhancing issues as well as life-preserving ones. He sees it as cutting across social , medical and sexual ethics. He sees the need to develop it in a way that is systematic but also analogical (covering issues that are different but having common characteristics). In this way he challenges all ofus to rise above our one-eyed enthusiasms, to become multi-issue persons while always remembering that the issues are unavoidably interdependent. My reflections in this chapter are subtitled "Is There a Historical Soft Underbelly?" By this title I mean in no way to undermine the validityof the moral vision captured in the phrase "the consistent ethic of life." I mean only to suggest that, if this vision is to become a true ecclesial and political leaven, it must face squarely factors that are likely to undermine or weaken it. It is precisely because I endorse the general thrust of the "consistent ethic" that I think it worthwhile lifting out in all honesty possible vulnerable points. Cardinal Bernardin certainly agrees; for he has repeatedly emphasized the desirability of vigorous but civil and charitable debate in this area. I will developthese reflections under two headings: (1) global prescientific convictions; (2) the rule "no direct killing of the innocent." 272 / Richard A. McCormick, S.J. 1. Global Prescientific Convictions This phrase is, as I noted in chapter 3, borrowed from Karl Rahner.1 He used it to refer to the unexplained assumptions, mostly cultural in character, that shape our moral perceptions and analyses. He was discussing bad moral arguments and explaining how they often trace to such assumptions. Philip Rieff had something very similar in mind when he referred to "reasons" that form the "unwitting" part of a culture and give shape to its habits, customs, policies and procedures.2 I will mention six such "unwitting assumptions"—three with more remote historical roots, three more contemporary in origin—that can easily act as obstacles to the effectiveness of a consistent ethic of life. 1. Biological giveness as normative. It is clear that in Cardinal Bernardin's various presentations on the consistent ethics of life, the human person is absolutely central. This is as it should be. Vatican II similarly placed the human person front and center at the very outset of Gaudium etSpes. Further on in that document, it stated that "the moral aspect of any procedure ... must be determined by objectivestandards which are based on the nature of the person and the person's acts."3 But such integral personalism was a conciliar achievement. It did not reflect the way decisive thinkers in the Catholic tradition proceeded. Furthermore, official teaching, notwithstanding the deliverances ofVatican II, still reproduces the basic anthropological assumptions of these decisive thinkers, as I shall try to indicate. That means that in some areas of practical moral instruction, the person is not really decisive. And if that is true, a "consistent ethic of life" rooted in the centrality of the person is somewhat undermined. Let St. Thomas be the examplehere.4 In his treatment ofthe content of natural law, Thomas pointed out that the order of our tendencies and the goods which are their objects determine the order of the precepts of the natural law. He identified three levels of natural tendencies and three corresponding goods: (1)The tendencyto the good corresponding to the nature the person has in common with all beings (self-conservation). (2) The tendency to goods relatingto the nature we share with animals. Here that pertains to the natural law which nature teaches to all animals (coitus and care ofoffspring). (3)The tendency to the good corresponding to the rational nature proper to human beings (knowledge of truth and social life). All of these tendencies and goods relate to the natural law in the measure that they can be regulated by reason. Formally, natural law is the law of reason. But the content of...