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25. The Great Flood of 1993: Did We Learn Any Lessons?
- University of Iowa Press
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25 The Great Flood of 1993 Did We Learn Any Lessons? Gerald E. Galloway In July 2008, following the Midwest floods, the United States Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held a hearing to review what had happened and what might be improved in management of flood risk (U.S. Senate 2008). The chairman of the committee, Senator Barbara Boxer, questioned whether any lessons had been learned from the floods of 1993 and asked the Hon. John Paul Woodley, assistant secretary of the U.S. Army, if he was familiar with a report that had been prepared for the White House following those floods (IFMRC 1994). Mr. Woodley indicated he was aware of the report, that he had put some of its recommendations to use, and that those recommendations that had been carried out brought positive results in 2008. Senator Boxer asked him to once again review this report to determine what recommendations had not been addressed. This chapter looks back at the report that came out of the 1993 floods and considers what has happened since it was presented to the President of the United States in 1994. From the fall of 1992 into the spring of 1993, the Midwest experienced greater than normal precipitation. In Iowa, the November–April rainfall was the second greatest in the 121 years of record (IFMRC 1994). So, when the summer of 1993 arrived, conditions were ripe for the creation of a major flood event—soils were 228 looking back,looking forward saturated, and many streams and rivers were already above their normal levels for early summer. Then, an unusual weather pattern sat over the region from June through late July and brought rainfall amounts that exceeded all historical records (IFMRC 1994). Small rivers began to overflow onto nearby lands and send their increasing flows downstream to fill larger rivers. By the middle of July, the nation was witnessing the devastating effects of the Great Flood of 1993 on eight midwestern states (figure 25-1). As floodwaters began to recede, total damages and recovery costs were estimated to exceed $22 billion, the largest flood loss in the United States in the 20th century. Thirty-eight deaths were attributed to the flooding. Over 100,000 homes were damaged. Crop losses from flooding and saturation of the soil reached $2.5 billion. Factories were closed and businesses were disrupted as transcontinental highways and railroads were severed by floodwaters and workers left the area. Navigation on the Mississippi River was halted, and loaded barges were tied up along the banks. Already-high levels of family stress grew higher. Six months after the floods began, water was still being pumped from fields in low-lying areas, and thousands of acres of farmland remained covered with sand and would never be farmed again (IFMRC 1994). FIGURE 25-1 The Des Moines River in flood, July 1993. Photograph by Andrea Booher, FEMA. [52.55.214.236] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 22:41 GMT) 1993: did we learn any lessons? 229 Thefloodsof1993broughtnear-continuoustelevisioncoveragetotheregion. As people across the country sat down to their evening meal, night after night they saw pictures of more inundated land, the agony of families leaving their flooded homes, and possessions under muddy waters. Later, they watched victimsreturntotheirdestroyedhomes ,communities,andfarmlands.Suchmedia coverage raised concerns about flooding across the nation. It spurred President Bill Clinton and members of the Congress from the Midwest to ask, “How did this happen, and what can be done to prevent it from happening again?” In 2008, much of the Midwest was again under water and struggled to understand how an event so similar to the 1993 floods, with its multibillion-dollar devastation, could once again occur. To answer this question, let’s back up to consider the federal government’s response to the 1993 floods. In November 1993, the White House established the Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee (IFMRC) within the Executive Office of the President. The committee was charged with finding out why the floods had occurred and what should be done to prevent flood losses in the future. Six months later, the committee reported (figure 25-2) to the president that: The floods of 1993 were the result of a significant rainfall event. Floods of that magnitude occurred in the past, and floods like the 1993 event would continue to occur. Locally constructed levees failed at an alarming rate, were poorly sited, and would fail again. States had provided little oversight of the construction and operation of such structures...