Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question One

BOOK FIVE Text of Aristotle: “Hence, the nature of a thing is a beginning and so is the element of a thing, and thought and will and essence and the final cause—for the good and the bad are the beginning both of the knowledge and the movement of many things.” (Metaphysics V, ch. 1, 1013a 1-3) “The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is, e.g. health is the cause of walking.” And this follows: “Things can be cause of one another, for example exercise of a good condition and good condition of exercise); not, however, in the same way, but one as the end and the other as the source of the movement.” (1013b 10-11) “And this principle is the final cause, for all the causes are not principles except it be for the sake of this first.” (Averroes, com. 1 near the end) [QUESTION ONE Is the end a principle and a cause?] Is the end a principle and a cause, and is it a cause for the agent and is it a cause most of all? 1 [1] That it is not a principle: It pertains to the very idea of a principle that it be first (Bk. V, ch. 1 of this work).1 But to be last pertains to the very idea of an end (Bk. V of this work in the chapter ‘On the Perfect’).2 First and last are opposed. 2 That it is not a cause: For, either it is such qua being or qua non-being; not the second, because non-being is the cause of nothing; the end is the cause of being, therefore, etc. Neither is it a cause qua being, because an end is only a cause insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act. But when the end is attained or exists, the efficient cause is no longer 1 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 2, 1012b 35-1013a 1. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 16, 1021b 25-31. 344 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS moved; indeed, it ceases to act, because “when the state sought is present the motion ceases.” (Bk. I On generation).3 3 That it is not a cause with respect to the efficient cause: For if it were, the efficient cause is also the cause of the end; then the same thing with respect to the same is both cause and caused, and consequently, is both naturally prior and naturally posterior. 4 It also follows that the same thing would be the cause of itself, because “whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused,”4 and ‘whatever is prior to the prior, is prior to the posterior .’5 Wherefore, if the end is the cause of the efficient and the efficient cause is a cause of the end, then the end is the cause of the end, and the same holds good about the prior [i.e., the prior is the cause of itself]. 5 Also, it would then follow that a demonstration of the reasoned fact is circular, or at least it can be—which is false according to the Philosopher in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 3.6 For the same thing would be prior and posterior with respect to the same. The implication is proved, because a demonstration of the reasoned fact is through the cause, and [if one cause is the effect of the other] and vice versa [the demonstration becomes circular]; therefore, if there could be demonstration of the efficient cause through the end, and vice versa, then [the implication] would be circular. 6 That it is not what is most of all a cause: For it is an extrinsic cause; matter and form are intrinsic, and an intrinsic cause seems to contribute more to existence than extrinsic causes. 3 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione I, ch. 7, 324b 16-17; Auctoritates Aristotelis, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 168: “Habitibus praesentibus exsistentibus in materia cessat omnis motus et transmutatio.” 4 Cf. Liber de causis prop. 1, ed. A. Pattin p. 49; Auctoritates Aristotelis, ed. J. Hamesse p. 231: “Quidquid est causa causae, etiam est causa causati”; Nicolaus Ambianensis, De articulis fidei I a. 1 (PL 210, 597): “Quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati”; Duns Scotus, Theoremata theor. 19 n. [8] (ed. Vives V 77b). 5 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 12, 14a 26-29. 6 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, ch. 3, 72b...