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The Only Question
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BOOK THREE THE ONLY QUESTION Text of Aristotle: “But it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae.” (Metaphysics III, ch. 3, 998b 25-26) Is the genus predicated “per se” of its proper difference?1 [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 [1] That it is: Man is per se rational [which is a proper difference]; therefore, what is rational per se is a man [a species]; hence, what is rational per se is an animal [i.e. a genus]. Proof of the first implication [i.e. that what is rational per se is a man]. The converse of a necessary proposition is a necessary proposition; therefore, the converse of a per se proposition is a per se proposition. Proof of the last implication [i.e. what is rational per se is an animal]: Because man includes animal per se. 2 Also, man per se is an animal; and man per se is rational; therefore, [what is rational per se is an animal]. Proof of the implication: As a necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises, so a per se conclusion follows from per se premises. 3 Also, Bk. VII of this work,2 when something is predicated of something according to the first mode of per se predication, one thing is predicated of another in the abstract; therefore, these statements are true: “Humanity is rationality” and “Humanity is animality.” Therefore, it follows that “Rationality is animality” and then the concrete [i.e. what is animal] is [predicated] of the concrete [what is rational] in the first mode of per se predication. 1 Cf. Duns Scotus, Porph. q. 16. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, ch. 12, 1037b 30-1038a 35. 248 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS 4 Also, in an essential predication, the predicate pertains to the notion of the subject; but in Bk. V of this work, in the chapter ‘On the Element’,3 it says that “where the difference is present, the genus accompanies it.” 5 Also, if it were predicated accidentally of the difference, it would be also predicated accidentally of the species. — Proof: for when anything is predicated of something accidentally, it is predicated accidentally of everything which is understood to be formally under that notion; but the species is understood to be formally under the notion of the difference; therefore, etc. 6 [2] To the contrary: If the genus were [predicated per se], then one animal would be many animals,4 because if the genus is in the notion of the difference , and animal is given in the definition with the difference, then either the same animal would be implied through the genus and also through the difference, and there will be a redundancy, because you give the notion of animal for animal; [where] animal is an animated sensible substance, and the notion of rational for rational, and the redundancy will be evident. If there is another animal, then man will be two animals. [I.—TO THE QUESTION] 7 To this Avicenna replies in Bk. V of his Metaphysics ch. 3,5 that although the genus and the difference are predicated of the whole per se, they do not signify the whole per se, but the genus signifies the material aspect, and the difference the formal aspect; but both signify a part of the species after the manner of a whole, and as the material lies outside the formal, so the concept of the genus is outside that of the difference. 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 3, 1014b 12-13. 4 Cf. Aristotle, Topics VI, ch. 6, 144a 36-37. 5 Avicenna, Metaphysica V, ch. 3, AviL 250-253. [3.214.184.69] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 14:39 GMT) BOOK III ONLY QUESTION 249 [II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS] 8 To the first,6 the first conversion [i.e. man is per se rational, therefore what is rational per se is a man] is invalid, but there is a fallacy of the consequent. Why? Because the higher [i.e. more comprehensive] notion [i.e. rational] does not have any reason why the lower [i.e. man] is in it. For in a subject there can be a reason why the predicate inheres in it, whereas there is no reason in the predicate why the subject inheres in it.—As for the proof, the inference is not valid, because the antecedent cannot be true necessarily , unless...