Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

Question One

BOOK TWO QUESTION ONE Text of Aristotle: “Therefore, the truth seems to be like the proverbial door which no one can fail to hit.” (Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 993b 4-5) Are first principles known naturally? Are the first complex principles or propositions, such as “Of anything whatsoever one can either affirm or deny it,”1 or “Every whole is greater than one of its parts,”2 and the like, known to us naturally? [Arguments Pro and Con] 1 [1] It seems that they are: The Commentator, in comment 1 on that passage in Bk. II of the Metaphysics3 that “truth seems like the proverbial door that no one can fail to find,” says that4 “the first principles in every category of being are naturally known to us.” 2 Also, they are not known to us by discovery, nor by teaching; therefore, they are known naturally, because there are no other way of knowing such. Proof of the assumption: Every thing known by teaching or discovery is known through something previously known, according to Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics.5 But there is nothing prior to first principles. 3 For the opposite: the Philosopher in III On the Soul6 says the soul of itself is like a blank tablet on which nothing is depicted. 1 Aristotle, On Interpretation, ch. 9, 18a 29-30; Topics, Bk. VI ch. 6, 143b 16. 2 Euclid, Elements I n. 8 (ed. H. Busard p. 33). 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics I, ch. 1, 993b 4-5. 4 Averroes, Metaphysica II, com. 1, 14rb. 5 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, ch. 1, 71a 1-2. 6 Aristotle, De anima III, ch. 4, 430a 1-2. 170 THE METAPHYSICS OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS Therefore, the soul as such and by its nature does not have any knowledge. [I. — TO THE QUESTION] 4 [2] Response: It must be said that [the intellect] does not have any natural knowledge according to its nature, neither of simples [i.e. concepts] nor complexes [i.e. propositions], because all our knowledge arises from sense perception.7 For first the sense is moved by something simple and not complex, and once the sense is moved, the intellect is moved and it understands simples, which is the first act of the intellect. Then after the apprehension of simples, the other act follows which puts simples together. After this composition, however, the intellect has by its natural light the capacity to assent to that complex truth, if that complex is a first principle. [II. — REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS] 5 To the Commentator8 I say that those things are said to be naturally known by us inasmuch as, given the composition of the simple terms, the intellect immediately by its natural light assents to and adheres to that truth. Nevertheless, the cognition of the terms is acquired from sensibles and that understanding is said to be a habit of principles whereby we adhere to first principles. 6 To the other:9 the cognition of principles, so far as simples are concerned, is acquired from sensibles. And to the assumption that i t is not acquired by discovery or teaching, one must say that these two categories divide up knowledge that is acquired through something previously known; but not the understanding that is a habit of principles. 7 [Objection] Against the reply to the first:10 If man by his natural light assented to the truth of principles, then all men equally would assent to such, because whatever follows from the 7 Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, ch. 18, 81b 6-9. 8 Cf. supra, n. 1. 9 Cf. supra, n. 2. 10 Cf. supra, n. 5. BOOK II QUESTION ONE 171 nature of man or of our intellect is found equally in all who have an intellect, which is contrary to the Commentator in the beginning of Bk. III of the Physics,11 where he says that some, because of custom have denied first principles. And he gives the example of Christians , who deny that principle: “From nothing nothing comes.”12 8 [Reply] To this it must be said that the argument applies to principles that are first in an unqualified sense, such as “It is impossible for the same thing to simultaneously exist and not exist,” and “Every whole is greater than a part of it,” and the like, in regard to which there can be no error according to the Philosopher in...