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93 Chapter Six Six Flags Over Nothing “No doubt, war is a tragic waste of human life and even a crime of sorts. But don’t try to tell that to the grieving parents of the dead.” Similar to most distant outposts in Vietnam, the combat base at Khe Sanh started out as a Special Forces camp. Situated approximately six miles east of the Laotian border and about twelve miles south of the DMZ, it was initially set up by the Green Berets in order to monitor the enemy’s movements into South Vietnam. With the help of the localBrutribesmen ,whowereaprimitiveindigenousmountainpeople, these highly trained U.S.soldiers ledtheir reconnaissance teams deep inside the dense jungles of Laos, while always on the lookout for enemy patrols and possible ambushes. From July of 1962 to August of 1966, they began to report a steady increase in the enemy’s activities . The surrounding valleysand mountaintrailsleading into I Corps were slowly being prepared by the NVA for the eventual movement of their larger units.1 94 Ground Pounder Beginning in September of 1966, a naval construction unit (CB10 ) and a battalion of Marines (1/3) unexpectedly showed up to rebuild the old airstrip and enlarge the perimeter.2 Within a matter of days, they had the place looking like a real military post. Realizing the implications of all this military brass snooping around their area, the Green Berets immediately packed up their gear and moved a few miles down the road near Lang Vei. It was a decision that they would eventually come to regret.3 Ever since the Marines had landed on the beaches of Da Nang in March of 1965, they had been busy patrolling the areas around the cities and villages situated near the coast. To the Marine commanders , the war was going to be either won or lost over which side could win over the general population. The idea of stomping around the remote mountains while looking for the NVA was not the way the Marines would have conducted the war. Possessing an impressive resume for fighting guerrillas in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, they believed the only way to defeat the enemy in South Vietnam was by establishing a group of secure enclaves all along the coast. Then once an area had been pacified and our economic and political programs had been given a chance to work, the idea was to slowly enlarge these enclaves by pushing our forces out to the next district. In this manner, our troops wouldn’t have been asked to retake the same bloodstained ground over and over again.4 Undoubtedly, it would have taken years before these programs would have had any positive effect upon the average peasant. But in the long run, the Marines believed our casualties would have been far fewer and the fighting would have been much more to our liking. However, the idea of fighting a defensive campaign was totally alien to the way in which the United States Army makes war. Sitting around and helping the farmers improve their lot, while waiting for the enemy to attack our positions, was unacceptable to everyone in [3.147.103.202] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 21:37 GMT) Six Flags Over Nothing 95 the Pentagon who wanted to win the war as quickly as possible. So when Westy ordered the Marines to send a battalion to Khe Sanh in the latter part of 1966, the leatherneck commander, Lt. Gen. Lewis Walt, was utterly dismayed at his decision. Strategically, he never had any intention or desire to push their meager forces out into these distant outposts. Between the inaccessible terrain and the unpredictable weather, he and his staff believed a force stationed at Khe Sanh would eventually find itself cut off and surrounded, much as the French forces had found themselves at Dien Bien Phu.5 OncetheoutpostatKheSanhhadbeenexpandedintoanactualair base, it didn’t take long before the NVA would sit up and take notice. Beginning in April 24, 1967, a platoon of Marines walked right into a hornet’s nest of NVA on Hill 861, only a few miles from the combat base.6 Triggering the onset of the infamous “Hill Fights,” where many of the new M-16s rifles failed to properly function, the local Marine commanderrushedseveralcompaniesfromfivedifferentbattalionsto thearea.7 WhilenotrealizingthathistroopswereupagainsttwoNVA Regiments(18thand95th),thefightingwasunexpectedlyintenseand savage among the towering hilltops and vine-covered slopes.8 Since the occupation of the surrounding hills (881 North, 881 South, and 861) were vital for the defense...

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