Worse Than Death: The Dallas Nightclub Murders and the Texas Multiple Murder Law

4 America

41 c hapter fou r America “He believes that there is something extremely special about him.” —Dr. Sheldon Zigelbaum Psychiatrist for the Defense I The tragedy of September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks upon New York City and Washington, D.C., focused attention on how visitors of other nations come to the United States. Some of the resulting debate included observations that it was too easy for dangerous people to penetrate American borders. Since that tragedy , pundits and many citizens voiced concern over the failings of intelligence services like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to preemptively identify visitors, legal and illegal, capable of such a monstrous crime. Included in the discussion were hard, pointed questions about the inability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to keep track of those already within our borders. Yet the United States clings to its heritage of openness. To close our borders is to close off ourselves to international ideas and influences . To close our borders is to reject our heritage. To close our borders is itself anti-American. On a much smaller scale, a similar debate has been argued within America’s borders for decades before September 11, 2001. One 42 • CHAPTER FOUR example grew up around Abdelkrim Belachheb in 1984. Even today , for Moroccans wishing to enter the United States, the web site of the American Embassy in Rabat and the Consulate in Casablanca answers the question “Why is there a visa requirement?” this way: “The United States is an open society. Unlike many other countries , the United States does not impose internal controls on most visitors, such as registration with local authorities. In order to enjoy the privilege of unencumbered travel in the United States, aliens have a responsibility to prove they are going to return abroad before a visitor or student visa is issued.”1 If one version of his many grandiose stories is to be believed, Abdelkrim Belachheb could be considered a terrorist. He claimed to have worked for a mob boss in Casablanca and to have aided nationalist causes in northern Africa. But other than his word, there is no evidence that he ever had such connections. Abdelkrim Belachheb was not a terrorist; he was never that important. Nor was he ever selfless enough to dedicate himself to a cause of any type. However, he was a dangerous individual and a fugitive from justice. He was a criminal exploiting the largesse of America’s open society. During the summer of 1980, Belachheb made his way to the American Consulate in Casablanca and applied for the easiest visa he could get. Today, it is referred to as a nonimmigrant Type B visitor visa. It is granted almost routinely to two groups: a B-1 visa is given to persons wishing to enter the United States to conduct business; a B-2 visa is a tourist visa issued to persons wishing to travel “for pleasure.” Both normally require documentation of some sort demonstrating an intent to leave the United States after a time specified by a travel authorization, usually not to exceed six months. The documentation usually takes the form of letters from friends in America who will be visited, confirmation of reservations for a planned or organized tour, or some other confirmation of subsistence such as hotel reservations and car rentals. Since the visa is based on visiting “for pleasure” the traveler is prohibited from gain- AMERICA • 43 ing employment while in the U.S. Thus, additional documentation is required to establish that the holder can support himself or will be supported by someone already legally in the U.S.2 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, an average of more than six million tourist visa applications were processed each year by the embassies and consulates of the U.S. State Department.3 Belachheb’s was but one. The era also needs to be placed in context. In the early 1980s, embassies and consulates were still reeling from the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, Iran, by Islamic fundamentalist followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Besides holding American hostages , the fundamentalists also captured a trove of highly sensitive U.S. intelligence documents. Shortly afterwards, the State Department instituted a policy whereby visa applications, and their accompanying documentation, were to be destroyed after a one-year period. The intent was to protect native employees of the embassies .4 So, if...