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The Reluctant Warrior: LBJ as Commander-in-Chief
- University of North Texas Press
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169 THERELUCTANT WARRIOR:LBJAS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GeorgeHerring,aprofessorofhistoryattheUniversityof Kentucky,isoneofthenation’sforemostscholarsoftheVietnam War.Heistheauthorofthreebooksonthatwar,and hismonograph,America’sLongestWar:TheUnitedStatesand Vietnam,1950–1975,isacknowledgedasoneofthebestgeneral works about that conflict. In addition to his books on Vietnam,ProfessorHerringhaspublishedthreeotherbooks aswellasscholarlyarticlesintheJournalofAmericanHistory ,PoliticalScienceQuarterly,DiplomaticHistory,andMilitary Affairs. Onseveraloccasionsduringhisacademiccareer,Professor HerringhasbeencalledtoserveaschairoftheDepartment of History at the University of Kentucky. His other honorsatKentuckyinclude:AlumniProfessor(1990);Distinguished Professor (1988); University Research Professor (1986–87);andHallamProfessorofHistory,(1985–87, electedbycolleagues).ProfessorHerringalsohasservedas presidentoftheSocietyforHistoriansofForeignRelations (1989). DR.GEORGEC.HERRING(UNIVERSITYOFKENTUCKY) 170 Vietnam LamentedLyndonJohnsonin1965,“Everytimewehavegotten neartheculminationofourdreams,thewarbellshaverung.Ifwe havetofight,I’lldothat.ButIdon’twant...tobeknownasaWar President.”1 Whateverhiswish,Johnsonisrememberedasawarpresident, andamongAmerica’scommanders-in-chief,hegenerallyrateswith theleasteffective.Heis,ofcourse,popularlyviewedastheonlyAmerican presidenttolosehiswar,somethinghegreatlyfearedandon morethanoneoccasionvowedhewouldnotlethappen.Heisscored, ontheoneside,asthestereotypical,shoot-from-the-hipTexan,the warmongerwhodestroyedVietnamtosavehisownego,andfromthe othersideasatimid,all-too-“political”warleaderwhorefusedtodo whatwasnecessarytowinaneminentlywinnablewar.2 SuchcriticismstellagreatdealaboutthewayJohnsonfoughtthe war,buttheydonotgetatthefundamentalproblemsofhiswarleadership .Tobefair,ofcourse,limitedwarisextraordinarilydifficultto fight,especiallywithintheAmericansystem,andVietnamwasawar thatprobablycouldnothavebeenwoninanymeaningfulsense.Still, the deficiencies of Johnson’s leadership contributed to the peculiar frustrationsoftheVietnamWaranditsoutcome,andthesedeficiencies derivedtoalargeextentfromhispersonalityandleadershipstyle. Lookingatsuchcrucialissuesashishandlingofpublicopinionandthe formulationofstrategy,IwillanalyzethewaysinwhichJohnsonexercised thedutiesofcommander-in-chiefinAmerica’slongestwar.3 Inalimitedwar,theroleofcommander-in-chiefisadmittedlya mostdifficultone.Intotalwar,thepresidentcanwraphimselfinthe 1 QuotedinGeorgeHerring,LBJandVietnam:ADifferentKindofWar(Austin: UniversityofTexasPress,1994). 2 Editor’snote:Dr.HerringpresentedthispaperattheUNTMilitaryHistory SeminaronOctober9,1999. 3 SeeGeorgeC.Herring,America’sLongestWar:TheUnitedStatesandVietnam, 1950–1975,2nd ed.(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1986). [18.225.117.183] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 20:26 GMT) 171 TheReluctantWarrior:LBJasCommander-in-Chief flag,rallythenation,andevensuppressthecriticismthatinpeacetime normallygoeswiththeoffice.Afundamentalprincipleoflimited war,ontheotherhand,isthatitshouldbewagedwithouttoomuch intrusionintothelifeofthenation.Thecommander-in-chiefmust setthetoneandthuscannotappearpreoccupiedwiththewartothe exclusionofotherthings.But,withmenandwomendyinginthe field,hecannotappearindifferent,either.Hemustwalkaveryhigh andthintightrope.Fromthebeginningofthewartotheend,Johnson struggledwiththisdilemma,butheneverquiteresolvedit. MostofhisassociateswouldagreewithClarkCliffordthatLBJ “wasthemostcomplexmanIevermet.”4 Hewasprodigiouslyenergetic ,obsessivelyambitious,proud,andoutwardlyvain.Hewasa drivenman,single-minded,manipulative,overbearing,andcapable ofgreatmeannesstothoseclosesttohim.Despitehishugeachievements , he remained profoundly insecure, and he was sensitive to thesmallestslight,realorimagined.At...