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“I wish to inform you of my decision, taken after lengthy and serious consideration ,to resign from the Leadership of our Party.I feel that this is the appropriate time for me to take this step.”1 Thus began the concluding chapter in the career of the civil servant turned politician for whom impartiality and initiative were hallmarks of his civil service career and foreign policy formulation. Pearson remained leader for the remaining months until Pierre Elliott Trudeau was confirmed as Liberal leader at the April convention and took the reins of government on 20 April 1968.This transition occurred almost five years to the day that Pearson had been sworn in as prime minister on 22 April 1963.Pearson’s intended departure did not detract from the attention given to the Middle East in Ottawa. Activity had been intense over the final passage of Security Council Resolution 242 and the appointment of Gunnar Jarring. The receptiveness by the Arab leadership was somewhat dubious in view of the Khartoum Summit’s decision of September 1967, which became known as the three No’s: No recognition , No negotiations, and No peace with Israel. As 1967 drew to a close,an official visit by Israeli prime minister Eshkol was scheduled for the 15 and 16 January 1968. This would be the second visit by an Israeli prime minister and the first since Ben Gurion’s visit of May 1961. Since the Israeli prime minister was going on a visit to the US, it was deemed logical, in view of the circumstances, to have Eshkol pay an official visit following his discussions with President Johnson and prior to those to be held in London.The Canadian visit would include trips to Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa. In a memorandum for the prime minister, Undersecretary Marcel Cadieux dealt with Israel’s security and its strong military situation vis-à-vis the Arabs. He felt that Israel should give the uar“appropriate assurances and encouragement to enter into negotiations looking towards a settlement.”2 Cadieux 8 Closing the Pearson Era referred to President Johnson’s words,“It is time for Israel to play some of its low cards.”3 In the memoranda prepared for the visit,the varied information and analyses dealt with the Israeli, Arab, and Canadian positions. Canada supported Israel’s policy of a permanent settlement, but differed on the question of Jerusalem. Lack of settlement was seen as detrimental to Israel’s position and a substantial withdrawal of forces was advocated, but within the parameters of a permanent settlement.There could be admission of small number of refugees who had fled after 4 June 1967. There was significant disagreement over Jerusalem because Israel had united the city under its jurisdiction. Canada maintained its two decades long position that the international community had legitimate interests and some international supervision in Jerusalem (i.e., UN responsibility to protect the Holy Places). Canada would likely not attend an Independence Day parade because the parade would involve passage through Jerusalem.4 The talking points section of one of the memoranda noted that Canada’s strong support at the UN was predicated on a non-return to the status quo ante in the region. Since External Affairs officials regarded direct negotiations as a major Arab concession, Israel would have to concede on a withdrawal to the 5 June borders as part of a final peace settlement.Again, as noted in the earlier Cadieux memo to the prime minister, an Israeli initiative was suggested. On the other points, Canada felt that Israel’s retention of Arab territory outside the 1949 armistice line “would not be justified.”5 Israel was urged to co-operate with the UN in the reasonable hope that Jarring’s mission as a special representative would go well and facilitate the end of belligerency and withdrawal . Polarization between the Soviet-backed Arab countries and the West would be lessened by a restoration of working relationships. The perennial Canadian concern with refugees was limited to Arab Palestinians. The refugee issue was to be dealt with on the basis of repatriation as a gesture, and on the assumption that few would opt to return to their homes in pre-state Israel. The possibility of refugee emigration to Canada was kept as a matter to be raised only if Eshkol mentioned it.Yet it was abundantly clear that whatever the number of immigrants, the solution of the issue had to be in the Middle East. Jerusalem, as well as East...

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