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7 Post Conflict and Compromise
- Wilfrid Laurier University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
The Six Day War formally ended on 11 June, following Syria’s acceptance of the UN Security Council’s ceasefire, in the wake of the uar (Egypt) and Jordan’s acceptance of the Security Council’s call. Their forces were severely defeated, yet their positions suffered no atrophy in the diplomatic and political realms. During the Security Council sessions at the end of May, and partially due to the Egyptian representative’s militancy, there was little progress. Canada maintained its unwavering faith in the United Nations. It joined Denmark in sponsoring a draft resolution that called for supporting the secretary-general’s efforts to calm the situation. This response, like the other resolutions, was of no consequence, save for the Council’s final resolution calling for an end to fighting. Meanwhile, Jerusalem was reunited and, following legislation by the Israeli Knesset, Minister of the Interior Hayim Moshe Shapiro extended Israeli jurisdiction over all of Jerusalem, which connected all the parts of the old and new cities. This development caused concern in Ottawa, as elsewhere. On 4 July, a Pakistani resolution was overwhelmingly adopted by the UN General Assembly criticizing Israel’s change of Jerusalem’s status and calling on Israel to rescind this decision. In a memorandum to the undersecretary of External Affairs, Carter took a cautionary stand with respect to Eban’s reply to the secretary-general. The Israeli foreign minister took exception to the term “annexation,”preferring“integration of Jerusalem”and“universal interest”in place of the “universal character of Jerusalem.”1 Hence, Carter suggested that “we should await general reaction to it at unga.”2 Another resolution, similar to the Pakistani one of 4 July, was adopted on 14 July. This resolution remained until the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly adjourned on 21 July to reassemble on 18 September. Some diplomats were still concerned that Canada was seen as too pro-Israel, even in moderate Arab eyes. As one official noted, “Goodwill and charitable 7 Post Conflict and Compromise actions (such as our support for unrwa) are not enough.”3 On 31 July,Geoffrey Murray of ExternalAffairs,who was involved with Pearson during the heady days of the Sinai–Suez crisis of the autumn of 1956,wrote to his colleague R.E.Collins that boundaries,canals,and other controversial matters apart,the essential fact is that Israel is not accepted.Concentration should be on statements that are not innovative and on showing“we are not as pro-Israel as we seem.”4 He was somewhat prescient when he suggested that,whereas Israel holds the strongest cards, the Arabs have the joker in terms of public opinion. Murray suggested that “aggression cannot be allowed to pay … short of some public statements … I suggest that we might be well advised to stay in our tents with the flaps tightly laced until the sand settles.”5 Canada, however, was still inclined to follow through on its June Security Council proposal that a special UN representative was needed. The representative could initiate discussions and explore positions.This was External Affairs Minister Martin’s position and certainly reflected a feature of Canadian foreign policy since its involvement in the establishment of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (unscop) in the spring of 1947. The emphasis for Canada was on procedural as opposed to substantive initiatives which could and should be left to the appointed representative(s) in order to move forward. The External Affairs minister noted about the special representative that“he can be useful simply as impartial and confidential channel of communication between the parties…. Unless exploration of positions is undertaken soon, positions may harden.”6 Martin was to discuss the matter with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and American UN representative Arthur Goldberg, and hoped to have some response from Foreign Minister Abba Eban. Ambassador Avner called on Martin who informed him of difficulty in getting a resolution for the appointment of a special representative. Doubting that anything could be resolved at this stage in the UN, Martin was still convinced of the need for a special representative.Avner hoped that Martin would urge direct and indirect negotiations in his forthcoming UN General Assembly speech.7 Martin’s concern for the Arab refugees led to his query about why the Israelis would not permit all the refugees to return to the West Bank. In response Avner noted: first, the security problem, second, incitement by the Jordanian government for passive resistance, and, finally, Israeli public opinion which was...