Can the World Be Governed?: Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism

Conclusion

Can the world be governed? After all the chapters in this volume, one might think that the answer was obvious. Yet, even with the views of the international relations experts expressed in these pages and the recommendations of the extensive literature on global governance reform to which they refer, uncertainty remains. In part, the difficulty is definitional. As I suggested in the Introduction, in looking at the global governance issue, one’s focus is blurred by the wide diversity of international organizations and institutions—a diversity that is mirrored in this volume. And even as most of the authors consciously focus on multilateralism—on international organizations and institutions, both formal and informal, and on the rules, principles, and norms that constitute global governance—our colleague from the Canadian government , Ferry de Kerckhove, raises a much broader concept: “a move from a multilateral system at the service of national interests to a true system of world governance.” In this volume, most of the analyses focus on the variety of international organizations, both formal and informal, and institutions, rules, principles, and norms that constitute global governance. Notwithstanding the plethora of definitions and the emergence of new, nonstate actors, especially in the global economy, that appear to have had an effect on Alan S. Alexandroff * * * Conclusion global governance,1 international organizations and institutions remain tethered to state behavior and to the national interest of states. So, while unilateral action is possible, it is equally likely that states will choose a multilateral approach. Now, it might be a simple matter of self-selection, but the view that arises from the chapters in this volume is that multilateral organizations can and do overcome the problem of collective action—not all the time, nor in all fields, nor necessarily effectively, but international organizations and institutions provide the setting and the incentive for states to cooperate, even where power is evidently unequally spread among states. States employ multilateralism across the international system: they act collectively to promote stability and curtail conflict. They also focus on global prosperity issues or, as Paul Collier notes, they collectively attack the development problem of divergence between rich and poor states. All these and other state actions are taken on a largely collaborative and multilateral basis. The question, then, comes down to this: can the international system generate “effective multilateralism.” as several of our authors and the volume ’s subtitle suggest? If so, how? Daniel Drezner offers a slightly more poetic goal: “to build a better mousetrap on the global stage.” But is “effective multilateralism” that mousetrap? A better mousetrap would be one built on the capacity for collective action—that is, on a willingness to exercise collective action. Effective multilateralism would then be far less likely to be measured on the congruence between leadership and the distribution of power than on the construction of a grouping of states that expressed a collective determination of leadership legitimacy. Such multilateral action, moreover, would have to be in furtherance of the expressed goals or mandate of the organization or institution. These criteria would again be used in determining global governance reform. But in proposing this perspective on effective multilateralism and global governance reform, one recognizes that there is no unanimity of approach—indeed, in this volume and elsewhere, many different analytic perspectives are advanced. For some analysts, the structure of multilateralism is built principally on the distribution of power. And with the redistribution of power that is occurring in the contemporary international system, the 404 l Alan S. Alexandroff 1. See, particularly, the writings of John Ruggie (2003, 93); see also Slaughter (2004). analysis of global governance effectiveness and reform grows ever more complicated and uncertain. Drezner points to a contemporary structural reality in which there is too often a mismatch between governance structures and the distribution of power in international relations. Many organizations and institutions that were created after World War II still reflect the distribution of leadership power that existed more than 50 years ago. The task of identifying effective multilateralism is made no easier when analysts or decision makers address legitimacy in the construction of international organizations. Restructuring governance, or insisting on reform, is both thankless and frequently unachievable—at least it would seem so. The classic case for this, in some ways, is the reform of the UN Security Council and the inability to revise its leadership significantly. The repeated failure to secure changes to the ranks of...