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113 Six.TheFourteenthCorpsAttack The third attack by Sherman’s army group on the morning of June 27 was the smallest, but it involved some of the best troops in Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland.Two Fourteenth Corps brigades of Jefferson C. Davis’s Second Division started from the same ridge that Newton used, but from a location a bit south of Newton’s position, and they aimed squarely at the angle in the Confederate line on Cheatham’s Hill. The men of McCook’s and Mitchell’s brigades had spent two nights resting in a wooded area, unaware that they were to play a bloody role in the attack. When officers aroused them from sleep at 4:00 a.m. on June 27, they instructed their men to eat breakfast before setting out two hours later. As the troops moved a short distance forward, regimental commanders gathered at brigade headquarters for instructions. The rank and file knew that trouble was afoot when they were told to leave their camp equipment and baggage behind. Haversacks, canteens, and sixty rounds of ammunition were all they would need for the task ahead. The morning already was warm, portending one of the hottest days of the campaign thus far.1 The conference of regimental leaders was brief but full. McCook told Lieutenant Colonel Allen L. Fahnestock that the Eighty-Sixth Illinois would take place as the second regiment in a brigade column of division.When the first regiment, the 125th Illinois, reached the Confederate line, Fahnestock was to move his men by the left flank so as to clear the front unit and then close up on the works. According to Fahnestock, McCook urged him to have his men “shove down the head logs on the rebels” in order to disconcert the enemy. As soon as he had a chance to do so, Fahnestock called a conference of his company commanders and explained to them what was expected of the regiment.2 Mitchell and McCook assembled in a field just behind the Federal skirmish line and close to the shallow valley that separated the Union position from the Confederates. Both brigades formed columns of regiments. 114 : tHE fourtEENtH corpS attacK McCook placed the 125th Illinois in front because its colonel, Oscar F. Harmon, was the ranking regimental officer. The Eighty-Sixth Illinois was next, then the Twenty-Second Indiana, and last the Fifty-Second Ohio. Each regiment stood ten paces behind the one in front and fixed bayonets. McCook also placed the Eighty-Fifth Illinois in front as a skirmish line. He controlled nearly 1,800 men in his brigade. Looking to the left, many of McCook’s men realized that a gap the size of a brigade front existed between their ranks and those of Harker’s command in the Fourth Corps. This circumstance occurred because all of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps units were attacking in columns instead of brigade lines, in contrast to the Fifteenth Corps units.While many survivors of June 27 tended to blame Oliver Otis Howard for choosing columns instead of lines, Jefferson C. Davis also opted to send his troops into this risky attack in columns as well.3 mccook’s brigade By now, everyone was aware that they were preparing for a major assault on the enemy fortifications.While the ranks were forming, officers dismounted and sent their horses to the rear for safekeeping. In all three corps attacks that morning, only Harker and Whitesides in Newton’s division were mounted. While standing with their men, some of McCook’s officers began to converse with their colleagues about the prospects ahead. Fahnestock talked with Harmon and Captain William W. Fellows of the 125th Illinois, assuring the two that he would rather surrender than see his regiment return unsuccessfully from the attack. It was rather bold talk that contrasted sharply with the feelings of James Lewis Burkhalter of the Eighty-Sixth Illinois . Burkhalter had so little faith in the success of the enterprise that he made a decision not to tell his men the details of what to expect for fear of depressing them. This violated Fahnestock’s explicit orders, but Burkhalter thought it was the best course.4 The mood among the rank and file was tense and foreboding. “There was an ominous stillness in the ranks,” recalled Major James T. Holmes of the Fifty-Second Ohio. “Here and there was a talkative, restless, profane old soldier.” Holmes heard one such man in the Twenty...

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