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Development over Democracy 5 When South Korea’s brief, undistinguished first experiment with democracy ended in 1961, a new consensus on the need for a strong government that could forge ahead with economic development quickly formed in Washington and Seoul. Americans and South Koreans agreed that improving the country’s economic situation was so crucial that it needed to be achieved even at the expense of democracy. But despite this broad understanding of the political future of the Republic of Korea (rok), important questions remained: How powerful should the government be? How much dissent would be tolerated? What type of economic model should be adopted? Americans and South Koreans did not always arrive at the same answers. They resolved their disagreements in different ways at different times. As South Korea’s economy improved during the 1960s, it became less dependent on the United States and Park Chung Hee gained greater leverage to resist U.S. influence. Between 1961 and 1963 American officials used the influence that economic aid bought them to force the recalcitrant junta to amend its economic policies and hold free elections. Once Park triumphed in an open election and transitioned to a civilian government, however, relations between the two governments improved. While Americans had insisted on a democratic government that allowed some measure of dissent, they also wanted the South Korean state to be strong enough to implement unpopular but necessary reforms. During the mid-1960s U.S. support for Park at critical junctures facilitated the emergence of a developmental autocracy . By the end of the decade, political and economic centralization within Park’s government went far beyond what the Americans considered necessary, however. U.S. officials in Seoul looked for ways to move the Park regime away from its increasingly authoritarian tendencies. But they found their influence limited by both the declining importance of American economic aid and the reluctance of policymakers in Washington to undermine Park at a time when they were focused on other parts of the world. A South Korean state that was strong but tolerant in the sixties thus gave way to virtually unrestrained authoritarianism by the 1970s. [128] Development over Democracy Civilianizing the Military Although the Kennedy administration welcomed Park’s exuberant commitment to economic development, the two years after his junta seized power were fraught with tension between U.S. and South Korean officials. The junta’s leaders were bold, nationalistic, and determined to improve conditions in their country. But at the same time they were truculent, autocratic, and mistrustful of American advice. Their military regime imposed strict limitations on civilian life and formulated economic plans that veered toward autarky. These policies sparked a series of conflicts between American officials and the rok government over how the South Korean political economy would be structured. The Americans used their considerable leverage to push the junta away from military rule and economic nationalism toward political and economic liberalization. Washington generally wanted to see Park remain in power and was willing to tolerate a junta-controlled government that was not fully democratic . At the same time, they needed assurance that the regime had at least nominal credibility as a democracy and some popular support. This meant ending the military dictatorship and creating a new civilian government that Park could lead but not completely control. Convincing the junta to abandon military rule proved an arduous task. Hard-liners like Kim Chongp’il, Park’s nephew-in-law and one of the engineers of the coup, warned that holding any elections could lead to the junta’s demise and the return of political instability. The question of whether Park would govern through a strong civilian government or a military dictatorship created serious frictions between the junta and the United States. A pledge made by Park, shortly after seizing power, to hold elections and restore civilian government after two years provided an important basis for U.S. policy between 1961 and 1963. Washington made it clear that while it considered the fulfillment of this pledge essential, it could accept a formally civilian government that Park would lead or indirectly control. In the summer of 1962 Ambassador Samuel Berger, in a communication to the State Department, explained the kind of political evolution that he considered desirable. The United States should ‘‘work on the assumption that [the] transition and election will be carried out on schedule and [that the] successor government will have some measure of constitutional legitimacy.’’ But...

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