Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations

Epilogue

321 Epilogue The Civil War was America’s greatest crisis, for it imperiled the republic both from within—the struggle between North and South—and from without— the threat of intervention by England and France. Whichever side won the war would largely determine the direction of the republic, and, as pure as the British and French claimed their neutrality to be, their actions would likewise shape its future to their advantage. Thus the story of the Civil War cannot be complete without an exploration of its international dimensions. Yet historians of Blue and Gray diplomacy remain small in number, particularly compared with the military and political historians of the conflict. Battles, generals, and politicians all helped to determine the outcome of the war; but so did diplomats. Had the Confederacy secured recognition from England (and then France and perhaps others), it would have gained the right as a nation to negotiate alliances, both military and commercial; call on its allies to help challenge the Union blockade ; and float loans necessary to finance the war. With the outcome hanging in the balance during the critical first eighteen months of the fighting, recognition might have tipped the scales in the Confederacy’s favor and ended the war by the close of 1862 or in mid-1863 with southern independence. But despite the countless discussions about intervention in London and Paris, Washington and Richmond, that moment never came. The Confederacy’s failure to win recognition did not by itself determine the victor in the war. But its inability to gain acknowledgment as a nation certainly contributed to its defeat. If so, why did the Confederacy fail to win recognition? Jefferson Davis was a poor diplomat, according to many writers. He did little to help the Confederacy’s case, both in his demeanor and in his actions. 322 Epilogue He appeared cold and stubborn, often inflexible about changing decisions, rigidly formal, and out of touch with his people. He was among the first to see no chance for recognition, yet among the last to concede defeat. So occupied with military matters, he did not give needed attention to foreign affairs. Davis remained shackled to legality, never understanding the European powers’ emphasis on national interests over international law and criticizing British neutrality as pro-Union in thrust because it was not proConfederate . Abraham Lincoln, on the other hand, personified a diplomat, as shown in his appointments, his realization that international (and domestic) law became flexible in wartime, and his ability to make meaningful public pronouncements . What he lacked in knowledge, he made up with a determination to learn. Admittedly, Lincoln miscalculated the British response to his wartime objective of preserving the Union, expecting the government and public to understand his political obstacles to tying slavery to the war effort. He also mistakenly assumed that the British government and people would react favorably to the Emancipation Proclamation and drop all thoughts of intervention. Yet, in his defense, they ultimately realized that he had taken a major step toward abolition regardless of the document’s lack of moral emphasis. In this and other public declarations such as the Gettysburg Address and his First and Second Inaugural Addresses, Lincoln’s words inspired listeners to seek those higher goals envisioned by the Founding Fathers. Nevertheless, the realistic considerations helping to shape a policy of foreign intervention far outweighed the role of personalities. Slavery was always an obstacle in British thinking, as the Earl of Donoughmore asserted to Mason in the spring of 1865. Confederate diplomacy was inept, according to many writers, beginning with Davis’s choice of emissaries abroad and continuing with King Cotton Diplomacy and a long record of fiscal and commercial mismanagement. Richmond’s leaders helped to undermine foreign relations by refusing to use cotton as collateral for loans until too late in the war, failing to develop a centralized purchasing program in Europe, and deciding against regulating business in the national interest. Another factor was Russia, which never seriously considered intervention and thereby undercut any Anglo-French action by eliminating itself as the only foreign power trusted by the Union. New research suggests that the great majority of British and French workers, and doubtless the bulk of British and French citizens, did not support the Confederacy despite their need for cotton. The Confederacy never proved its claim to independent status by winning deci- Epilogue 323 sively on the battlefield. And, finally, Seward’s repeated...