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(  ) The Politics of Power Cheddi Jagan’s defeat in December 1964 represented the triumph of AngloAmerican policy in British Guiana. Forbes Burnham became the new premier and the head of a coalition government, subsequently leading his country to independence in 1966. But Jagan remained a powerful force in the country, and it was not at all certain that Burnham would win any more elections, a prospect that worried the Americans. Harry Fitzgibbons, a functionary in the U.S. State Department, proposed to his colleague, a Mr. Sayre, a fanciful scheme that he hoped would rid Guyana of Jagan. Writing to Sayre on December 15, 1966, Fitzgibbons made his case: I think that if we are anxious to build a case against Cheddi, and if we would prefer not to have to do it artificially, then the following approach will encourage Cheddi to indulge directly in the kind of activities which would support (politically if not legally) a move to exile him. Assumption: If Jagan is convinced that Burnham has decided, with UK-US national and moral support, to rig the next elections, so that Burnham may well be successful in doing so, then Jagan will involve himself directly in subversive activities including terrorism. The Politics of Power (  ) Proposal: A. Leak through GOG [Government of Guyana] to Jagan the correct information that the US and UK recently held talks in London on the political and economic outlook for Guyana and what the two governments can do about it. B. Leak through GOG to Jagan the incorrect information that the US and UK have decided that only rigged elections can guarantee Burnham’s remaining in power, and that the two governments have agreed to commit effectively unlimited resources—in money and man power—to see that fraudulent elections take place successfully. C. Leak through GOG to Jagan the incorrect information that coordinated operations toward successfully rigged operations will begin in earnest imminently. Conclusion: I suspect that Cheddi will decide that he can’t afford the luxury of insulating himself from the planning and preparation, if not the execution of the PPP’s counterattack.1 Fitzgibbons’s memorandum reflects the Machiavellianism that had characterized America’s attitude toward Cheddi Jagan and its policy in British Guiana since 1961, when it began to take an active interest in the affairs of the colony. Much of the unrest that engulfed Guiana between 1961 and 1964, as will be shown, can be attributed to U.S. subversive activities. British Guiana’s interests and its future needs took second place to the national imperatives of the Americans, with the acquiescence of the British. “WE MUST NOT ALLOW ourselves to be deluded. Freedom will not be granted on a platter,” Cheddi Jagan wrote in the Mirror, the organ of the PPP, on December 20, 1963. The ardent champion of Guiana’s independence was making one of his bitter assaults on colonialism in the waning months of his premiership. “British Guiana is the acid test of the wickedness of the imperialists ,” he declared. “They talk about democracy and freedom but openly sabotage and reject these principles here.” Jagan’s lament was dramatically poignant: he was not destined to lead his country into independence, and he probably knew it at the time. “British Guiana proves one thing,” Jagan said with some resignation. “The colonialists will give freedom if they are forced to do so as in Algeria and elsewhere or if theycan find willing stooges to carry on their policy under a new guise of neocolonialism.”2 Jagan would never have volunteered to be a willing stooge of the colonialists , nor would he have allowed himself to be so designated. He admired [3.141.0.61] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 10:24 GMT) (  ) The Politics of Power those colonial leaders who used violence to advance the cause of their country ’s independence but did not advocate such a strategy for British Guiana. American consul general Everett Melby interpreted Jagan’s piece in the Mirror as an “implied threat of violence,” on the one hand, or “a pathetic bluff,” on the other. Melby could not avoid diminishing Jagan’s sustained contribution to the independence movement in Guiana. “Jagan has often talked of violence and compared himself to revolutionary leaders,” the consul general observed, “but in his 20 years of political activity, Jagan has mainly talked and acted very little; his heroes have generally moved before they began talking.”3 Cheddi Jagan was the most committed Guianese nationalist who sat in...

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