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C hapter 3 TheAftermathofSoto,ca.1541–1650 Chicaza and the other chiefdoms of present-­day northeast Mississippi either fell or underwent fundamental reorganizations after the Soto entrada. Unfortunately, the history of the years between 1541, the last year that Soto was in Chicaza, and 1682, the year of the first European encounter with Natives from this region following Soto, is undocumented, and the archaeology for these 140 years is quite sparse. However, we can place Chicaza within the history of the larger Mississippian world in the first decades after Soto’s invasion, for which we have better information and from which we can make some inferences about what happened at Chicaza. Most scholars agree that the military losses at the hands of the early explorers and the destabilization of Native chiefdoms had a profound effect on many Mississippian polities. Soto and his men came as a conquering army, and the intense combat of a direct military assault by the Spanish may have precipitated the collapse of some chiefdoms. This was probably the case at the chiefdoms of Napituca in northern Florida, Anlico in Arkansas, and Tascalusa in Alabama.1 Unlike these battles, Indian casualties at the battles of Chicaza and Alimamu seem to have been low. Therefore, it is unlikely that Spanish conflicts with Chicaza and Alimamu alone could account for the fall of these chiefdoms. Soto’s prolonged stay and ransacking of the region for food, however, would have had quite serious repercussions. As we have seen, when Soto and his army of 600-­plus men trekked through the southern interior, they depended on the food stores of Native people. Not only did the Spaniards take food throughout the winter at Chicaza, but they also stole food for their 61  The Aftermath of Soto anticipated seven-­day (or more) trek across the large uninhabited zone to Quizquiz. All of the chroniclers remarked on the scarcity of food by March and especially on the Spaniards’ inability to refurbish their stores in preparation for the upcoming journey. Clearly, Soto’s army had depleted local stores as well as any emergency surpluses. Although Mississippian people knew much about utilizing wild plant and animal foods, such a shortage of stored cultivated crops would have meant hardship for all and starvation for some. Plus, the leadership of the Tombigbee chiefdoms partly derived from being able to procure and secure stores of food for just such emergencies, and if the leadership failed on this count, these polities could also have been subjected to political unrest.2 Mississippian polities were no strangers to internal political stresses that could easily break into out-­and-­out rebellions. Scholars have long attributed the rise and fall of Mississippian chiefdoms to chronic warfare and factional competition between elites within a chiefdom. As we have seen, the lines of leadership in Mississippian politics were multiple and gave ample opportunity for contesting successions to office. This was especially true during times of stress and during succession to the chieftainship, as the bitter contestation between elites in Guale and Apalachee during the seventeenth century attests .3 Factions, then, could develop within lineages and between the ranked lineages, resulting in a continuous jockeying for power within a polity’s political order. If, as suggested above, Soto’s depletion of local food stores created civil unrest, any number of political factions would have been ready to exploit the situation. It is likely that Soto’s presence upset the balance of power in other ways as well. Records from the expedition across the South describe several instances when micos of chiefdoms were challenging and defying the authority of a chief under whose power they had fallen. We saw this at Chicaza when Sacchuma refused to pay tribute. In these political struggles, the more powerful mico often enlisted Soto’s influence and military aid to extinguish the rebellion , as Chicaza did. In some cases, such as that of Casqui and Pacaha, a savvy lesser mico used Soto to bolster his authority and military in challenging an overarching mico. In either case, given the fragile nature of the ties binding simple chiefdom alliances, complex chiefdoms, and paramount chiefdoms, the presence of a new and powerful ally could easily upset the balance of power, resulting in a reshuffling of authority. At Chicaza, there is good evidence for such political maneuvering between Chicaza and his subordinate mico at Sacchuma, and the Alimamu stand may also have been another tactic [18.119.126.80] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 01:31...

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