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{ 124 } ChaPTer Ten The Fourth Offensive By August 12, after nearly two weeks of idleness following the Crater battle, Grant was ready to begin another offensive. He hoped that Lee had diverted enough troops to the Shenandoah Valley to give a Federal strike some hope of success. Initially, Grant thought of holding the lines only with black troops, perhaps supplemented by the white soldiers of the Tenth Corps. He estimated that placing one man every six feet in the trenches would be enough to hold the Bermuda Hundred line, and one man for every four feet could secure the Petersburg defenses. Backed up by a reserve force, this “thin skirmish line” would free maximum strength foroffensive operations.Grant wanted Hancock to once again spearhead the drive north of the James River by wayof Deep Bottom . He held open the possibility of organizing a complementary strike south of the Appomattox River if circumstances warranted. The operation might force the Confederates to recall troops that were reportedly marching from Petersburg to the Shenandoah Valley.1 Plans called for Hancock to embark his corps on steamers at City Point and pretend to head for Washington, D.C., but the boats would actually steam up the James Riverat dark and deposit the troops just downstream from Deep Bottom . Two divisions of Birney’s Tenth Corps and Gregg’s cavalry division were earmarked to cross the James over a pontoon bridge to be laid just upstream from Deep Bottom.This was the same location where the engineers had placed the second pontoon bridge for the Third Offensive the previous month. All or parts of the Fifth and Ninth Corps could sally forth if Hancock, Birney, and Gregg could force Lee to weaken the Petersburg defenses.2 seCond deeP BoTToM Initially, Birney and Hancock operated on separate lines of advance. Terry’s division and two brigades of Turner’s division crossed the newly laid pontoon bridge as sixteen boats carried the Second Corps from City Point up the James The Fourth Offensive { 125 } River on the night of August 13. While Birney was to attack the southwardfacing Confederate line defending New Market Heights, Hancock was to attack the east-facing line.3 More Confederates waited than they expected. Field commanded seven brigades at or near Deep Bottom: five were his own, and two were detailed from Wilcox’s division. A small cavalry brigade covered his left, for a total of 8,220 men. In addition to these troops, Ewell commanded about 2,900 infantry and artillery. Against this force of 11,120, the Federals brought 29,000 infantry and cavalry.4 The Union offensive got off to a rocky start. Tilghman’s Wharf, located half a mile downstream from Deep Bottom, had been destroyed by the Confederates and was not yet repaired. Many boats could not extend their gangplanks to the river bluff. The troops had to unload onto the decks of light draft vessels anchored closer to shore while labor details tried to patch together the docks. It took more than five hours for Hancock’s lead division under Mott to get onshore , while the rest of the corps disembarked by 9:00 a.M. of August 14.5 Birney was ahead of Hancock, crossing the pontoon bridge at Jones’s Neck at 5:00 a.M. on August 14. He then advanced northward and captured Field’s picket line, but he halted when confronted by the main line of works at the foot of New Market Heights. Grant later confirmed Birney’s decision not to attack when he learned how strong the Confederate position appeared to be. When Birney slowly shifted his command eastward across Bailey’s Creek to connect with Hancock, Terry’s men surprised and captured four eight-inch howitzers in an exposed position.6 Hancock’s advance from Tilghman’s Wharf fared little better. He pushed northward in two columns, with Mott’s division turning left onto New Market Road and advancing toward Tilghman’s Gate. Mott pushed Confederate skirmishers back but halted before a redoubt filled with artillery. Barlow’s and Gibbon’s divisions (the latter temporarily under Smyth) advanced to the north along Darbytown Road. They initially met only Gary’s cavalry brigade. Barlow mishandled the advance and delayed his movement to Bailey’s Creek long enough for Field to send two infantry brigades to the scene. As in July, Hancock ’s advance was stymied on the east side of the creek.7 Hancock hoped Birney’s command could...

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