The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi

16 End Game

286 16 } End Game E nding a war often proves more difficult than starting or even winning it, and the Rebel government offered no guidance for how its military forces should deal with the many issues involved with bringing peace to the land. Therefore, Confederate commanders in the West were on their own in terms of dealing with Union commanders . For their part, Federal officers had only scant guidelines on how to deal with their Southern counterparts. The war in the West came to a close over the span of a couple of months, concluding a bit differently in different areas. Another problem quickly emerged: how to help the thousands of citizens made destitute by the immediate effects of Union campaigning? North Carolina Leaving his massive army under the temporary command of John M. Schofield, Sherman made a quick trip to City Point, Virginia , to consult with Grant and Lincoln on March 27–28, 1865. The three Union commanders met in a cabin on the steamer River Queen, and Sherman talked with Grant separately as well. Sherman came away from the conference believing the president’s main points were that the Confederates must be disarmed and returned to their homes as soon as possible.1 In contemplating the final push toward Petersburg, Sherman advised Grant that he could not start from Goldsboro until April 10. He was certain that Lee would evacuate Petersburg before he got there and attempt to join Johnston. “We must go straight for him and fight him in open ground,” Sherman insisted, believing that either he or the general in chief “would have to fight one more bloody battle, and that it would be the last.”2 Grant was unwilling to wait until April 10 for Sherman to leave Goldsboro. He wanted to finish the war in Virginia as early as possible and was persuaded that the combined forces of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James could handle Lee’s men. Grant therefore started another offensive against the Confederates on March 29—​a major drive to turn Lee’s right flank. Schofield later End Game 287 explained that Grant and Sherman had divergent views on how to end the campaign at Petersburg: Sherman wanted Lee and Johnston to join forces for a final showdown with his own men, whereas Grant wanted to keep the two Confederate armies separated until the Eastern troops could end the long campaign. In the end, Grant’s view of operations won out, and the Eastern veterans did not have to share the glory of Appomattox with their Western counterparts.3 Sherman reorganized his force while resting at Goldsboro. Slocum’s Army of Georgia would continue to constitute his left wing and Howard’s Army of the Tennessee his right, but Schofield’s Twenty-­ third Corps, with Terry’s division of the Army of the James, would serve as his center. They planned to set out on April 10, and their immediate objectives would be Raleigh and Johnston’s command.4 By April 5, rumors began to circulate near Goldsboro of a great battle at Petersburg. The next day, details of Lee’s defeat and his evacuation of both Petersburg and Richmond on April 3 were confirmed. The report led to extensive celebrations in the Union camps. Sherman continued to plan for a departure date of April 10 while praising Grant for his final success at Petersburg: the result of his ten-­ month-­ long campaign to win the Virginia city had “established a reputation for perseverance and pluck that would make Wellington jump out of his coffin.”5 Although Lee’s defeat at Petersburg cast a pall over the Confederate cause, Jefferson Davis tried to make the best of a bad situation. Just before evacuating Richmond, the president outlined whatever thoughts he had about military movements by expressing the hope that Sherman could be prevented from joining Grant. Only by rapid movement and decisive action could that be effected. “To fight the enemy in detail, it is necessary to outmarch him and surprise him.” Yet Davis knew that if Sherman and Grant united, “the enemy may decide our policy.” Johnston held little hope of success, telling Lee that “Sherman’s course cannot be hindered by the small force I have. I can do no more than annoy him.”6 General Robert E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox on April 9 was the turning point in the Confederate end game. Twentieth Corps commander Alpheus Williams learned of it...