Truth and Politics: A Theological Comparison of Joseph Ratzinger and John Milbank

Ratzinger’s Theology of Politics and Milbank’s Political Theology

6 Ratzinger’s Theology of Politics and Milbank’s Political Theology In the previous chapter it was shown how both theologians’ threefold perspectives on truth in relationship to Vico leads to two different conceptions of the nature-grace relationship. On the one hand, while Ratzinger upholds that nature and grace are related, he nonetheless defends the integrity of the natural order, as is evident in his approach to scientific, aesthetic, and moral truth as defined by natural law. Milbank, on the other hand, advocates a radical integration of nature and grace to such an extent as to practically reject any degree of autonomy of a natural order from a supernatural one. For Milbank, in accordance with his theory of truth, the natural order and the graced order occur in one single extension, with the grace of faith defining all stages of the continuum. In contrast, for Ratzinger the natural order and the graced order are related, but not in the sense of a continuum. Instead, for him the natural order, with respect to sanctifying grace and the gift of faith, maintains at least a relative 221 perfection, even when not explicitly ordered to faith. This is a position that Milbank denies.1 In this chapter, we will focus our attention on the related noetic faith-reason relationship. It will become quickly apparent how two very different political visions result when Ratzinger’s and Milbank’s two conceptions of the nature and grace relationship, as determined by their explanations of truth, are reflected in the faith-political reason relationship. While Ratzinger, in accordance with his defense of a relative autonomy of a natural order from the supernatural one, clearly distinguishes the political order from the ecclesial order, Milbank, on the other hand, radically integrates the two. This leads Ratzinger to develop what his former doctoral student Vincent Twomey calls a “theology of politics,” in which faith and political reason are accorded a certain degree of autonomy from one another.2 This term was coined by Twomey “to contrast with ‘political theology,’ a concept that Ratzinger rejects, namely, any theology, such as that of J. B. Metz or the classical forms of liberation theology, that involves the instrumentalization of either the Church or the faith for political purposes or the attribution of sacral or salvific significance to politics.”3 In contrast with Ratzinger, Milbank, out of his radical integration of nature and grace grounded in his active concept of truth, in accordance with Vico’s equation of truth with factum, develops a political theology in which faith is wedded to one particular political expression, socialism. In presenting their contrasting views, I will begin with Ratzinger. 1. Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (Eugene: Cascade, 2009), 306: “Unless other disciplines are explicitly ordered to theology (assuming that this means participation in God’s self-knowledge, as in the Augustinian tradition) they are objectively and demonstrably null and void, altogether lacking in truth.” 2. Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2007), 72–73. 3. Ibid. TRUTH AND POLITICS 222 Faith and Political Reason according to Ratzinger In defending the relative autonomy of faith from reason, in accordance with his moderate integration of nature and grace and his definition of truth in relationship to reception, Ratzinger disagrees with theologians who, after Vatican Council II, “transformed de Lubac’s theology of Catholicity into a political theology that sought to put Christianity to practical use as a catalyst for achieving political unity.”4 According to Ratzinger, this transformation does not follow de Lubac’s thought “to its logical conclusion.”5 Rejecting this transformation of de Lubac’s thought does not mean, argues Ratzinger, that he is advocating an individualistic manner of perceiving Christianity in which grace mediated by the church only has relevance for the individual soul and not also for the human being as a whole. 4. Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1987), 51. According to Ratzinger, Catholicity, understood in a collective sense, and not individuality is essential for conceiving Christianity correctly for de Lubac. In explaining this, Ratzinger writes, “What is being expressed here is, first of all, a collective view of Christianity to replace the individual or purely institutional manner of thinking. It was in this framework that Henri de Lubac’s designation of the church as a sacrament made its appearance in the 1930s. . . . The...