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14 Self and Situation T he theoretical usefulness of the construct of a self depends in part on what it is intended to bring to notice. For the point of view under consideration , that is a complex temporality of action coordinated with the actor conceived of as a particular for which the skin is a natural boundary that individuates certain “events” sufficient to provide a general grounding for motivation and to integrate the various dispositions necessary for the formation and implementation of specific intentions. The integrity of the temporal dimension is confined to and supported by a self-articulating identity the tendencies of which continue throughout the physical life of the person, constituting, mysteriously but by more than mere accretion, a psychical structure. Change is thereby conceived of teleologically, as an effect of a series of total adaptations to external facts without any significant change of identity: there is no internal source of transformation; nor could there be. Such a self-identity is not at all mysterious to the portion of the person’s mind that reflects on herself as a spatially and temporally limited totality, what Mead (1962) referred to as the “me” that is knowable in contrast with the ineffable “I” that knows but is not knowable. However, self and mind are, on this view, neither equal nor merely complements. The former is, ultimately, subject to the latter, though the distinction between the two and the subordination of self to mind are as yet confusing parts of the standard picture. Therefore, one is not surprised by who one had been, and is able to project, prudently, what one will be in making a rational decision in the interest of that continuous, trans-situational self, which may or may not be in the interest of the situationally responsive portion of the self. Concretely situated decisions are brought about by what appears to be either the mind as a portion of the self or something apart from it. Moreover, 234 Chapter 14 it is not clear from the standpoint of defining the agentic feature of a projected action whether there is one self or two or whether there is a total subjectivity at work that, in still another guise and under its own local conditions, takes into account the whole self of which it is either a part or moment. There are, then, endless theoretical problems and a constant need for further supplements whenever the term “self” is deployed. Yet there are two important insights provided by its use. For one, the idea of action in which an individual reconciles desires and beliefs in a particular describable situation is insufficient to account for what that actor appears to be doing—once one acknowledges the problematic aspects of the idea of a situation and the impossibility of extending a severely reductive paradigm to facts only available prior to the reduction (as in adding the idea of a self to overcome the insufficiency of reasons to action in the standard account). The second insight is that the temptation to refer to a self is so fraught with logical difficulties that it appears necessary to think of possible alternatives—to the concept of a self, to the concept of action, or to the individualistic theory of action that cannot resolve on its own terms the problem of the gap. It is important to remember that the supplemental “self” does no more for theory than address the question of how, not whether, individuated intentions are linked to undertakings; in other words, it is designed precisely to leave the reductive simplification in place both for the sake of the standard theory and, paradoxically, for the sake of a universe of human affairs beyond a paradigm that cannot represent such a universe. One compelling alternative begins negatively, with the counter-supposition that self-identity and individuality are not valid as initial or primary referents for a general account of agency, rationality, and the intelligibility of what has been or is being done by social beings. Positively, it says that an analysis of “sociality ” is necessary if the proposition that humans are essentially social is to be taken seriously in trying to understand human affairs, including whatever humans do by way of being human. To the extent to which “action” is intended to stand for just such activities, the theory can be challenged for the adequacy of its paradigmatic simplification. This may afford an opportunity to develop principles from within the ontological field of the human sciences...

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