Evaluating Art

Chapter Seven: Experiencing Art: Wolterstorff

CHAPTER SEVEN Experiencing Art: Wolterstorff In Chapters Four and Six, I examined Monroe Beardsley's and Nelson Goodman's opposing theories of art evaluation. Both view art evaluation as instrumentalist; that is, both hold that art is to be evaluated according to its ability to produce aesthetic experience. However, their views differ radically over the nature of aesthetic experience . B,eardsley holds that aesthetic experience is detached and that its content consists solely of aesthetic qualities that are nonreferential . Goodman holds that aesthetic experience is not detached and that its evaluatively significant content consists solely of referential characteristics. Goodman characterizes aesthetic experience as a kind of cognitive experience and correctly concludes that his view of aesthetic experience is diametrically opposed to Beardsley's view. Since Beardsley's conception of aesthetic experience is so close to the traditional, post-Schopenhauerian conception of the experience properly produced by works of art, and Goodman's conception is very different, it is reasonable to think of Beardsley's conception of the experience as aesthetic experience and to think of Goodman's conception of the experience as cognitive experience. I concluded that Beardsley is right to hold that aesthetic, nonreferential characteristics of works of art are important for the evaluation of art and that Goodman is right to hold that cognitive characteristics of works IIS EXPERIENCING ART of art are important for the evaluation of art. This means of course that Beardsley is wrong to exclude cognitive characteristics and that Goodman is wrong to exclude (possessed) aesthetic characteristics as being unimportant for the evaluation of art. Nicholas Wolterstorff has made a substantial start in the direction of stating a view that synthesizes Beardsley's and Goodman's views, although he does not explicitly mention Goodman's theory. Interestingly , Wolterstorff does not present his view in a journal article or a scholarly book but in an introductory text, Art in Action,1 written for students who are committed to a Christian point of view. The religious orientation of Wolterstorff's book gives it an advantage over both the usual introductory aesthetics texts and the usual scholarly book. Approaching aesthetics from the religious point of view allows Wolterstorff to view works of art from a wider perspective than most aestheticians do. For example, he is concerned not only to give an account of works of art such as concertos, which are played by musical groups for musical audiences, but also an account of church hymns, which are sung by a congregation. By concerning himself with works of art that other aestheticians seldom if ever reflect on, Wolterstorff notices things about works of art that aestheticians frequently overlook. Wolterstorff's remarks about art evaluation are useful in the present endeavour because they provide a basis for bringing together what can be derived from the two traditions represented by Beardsley 's and Goodman's theories. Wolterstorff, like Beardsley and Goodman, conceives of works of art as instruments, but whereas Beardsley and Goodman conceive of works of art as instruments with a single purpose (for producing either aesthetic experience or cognitive experience), Wolterstorff has a more complicated view. He agrees that some works of art are instruments with a single purpose, but he also maintains that some other works of art are instruments with several purposes. The purpose (or purposes) that Wolterstorff has in mind is the II6 EXPERIENCING ART purpose (or purposes) for which a work of art is "made or distributed ." One important purpose of works of art, as Wolterstorff sees it, is the "purpose of contemplation for aesthetic delight." 2 In this he is in agreement, to a degree, with Beardsley. In his presidential address, Beardsley gives a definition of "artwork" in terms of aesthetic purpose: "An artwork can be usefully defined as an intentional arrangement of conditions for affording experiences with marked aesthetic character."3 Wolterstorff goes on to characterize aesthetic excellence as follows: "An aesthetically excellent object is one that effectively serves the purpose of contemplation for aesthetic delight."4 For Beardsley, aesthetic value is the only kind of value relevant for the value of art; that is, for him, aesthetic value and artistic valwe are identical. Wolterstorff, however, recognizes artistic values other than aesthetic value, for example, cognitive, moral, and religious values. Thus, Wolterstorff distinguishes between artistic and aesthetic value-aesthetic value being for him one among several artistic values. He characterizes artistic excellence as follows: "A work of art has artistic...