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1 Foundations Old and New The Problems of (Environmental) Philosophers On many, if not most, academic measures, the field of environmental ethics can be considered a great success. Today, courses in environmental ethics and philosophy are offered in the majority of college and university curricula; in many places, these are taught outside philosophy departments (e.g., in environmental studies programs; schools of public policy, forestry, and natural resources; and, in my own case, the life sciences). The field has produced a large and interesting literature, including major textbook anthologies, monographs , and a growing fleet of academic journals. Professional societies have been established, and dozens of national and international meetings focusing on environmental ethics issues and themes have been held. In sum, the field has, in only a few short decades, carved out its own intellectual identity and become a fixture in the applied philosophical landscape, taking its place alongside its bioethics, business ethics, and engineering ethics counterparts. Judged on more pragmatic criteria, however, the field does not score nearly as high. In fact, a candid appraisal of environmental ethics based solely on its public policy and management impact would likely conclude that it was something of a failure. If this seems an unfair standard for evaluating an academic discipline, especially a branch of philosophy (which often measures itself by its ability to transcend the affairs of daily life), we should remember that a major part of the justification of the field when it formed in the 1970s was to provide a focused philosophical response to society’s environmental problems. Species extinction and the loss of wildlands, air and water pollution , overpopulation and resource scarcity, global climate change, and the decline of ecosystem services: These problems have evoked and continue to 2 / Chapter 1 generate serious ethical concerns and obligations, from our responsibilities to nonhuman species and ecosystems, to our character as local (and global) ecological citizens, to our duties and obligations to achieve a fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens for present and future generations. Yet it would be difficult to mount a convincing argument that environmental ethics discourse has made a significant contribution to tackling these societal challenges or that it has played an important role in the environmental policy process or conservation planning and practice more generally. On the contrary, the field seems to have become increasingly irrelevant to addressing the major environmental problems facing society as we move deeper into the twenty-first century. Instead of (for example) becoming a productive ally in the work of shaping, critiquing, and justifying sound environmental policy agendas or clarifying key debates and normative standards in public discussions over alternative management actions, environmental ethics has largely chosen to turn inward, becoming an increasingly specialized and insular academic discourse . Although it may be a discourse of great intellectual and professional value to philosophers and other environmental theorists, it has proven to be of comparatively little value—and to have little tangible impact—in the “real world.” This certainly seems to be the view of those who have worked in and studied the environmental policy and management domain. Donald A. Brown, an authoritative voice on the subject, with decades-long experience in the policy trenches at the state, federal, and international levels, has observed that the work of environmental ethicists “is almost never read by policy makers and infrequently considered in day-to-day decision making about pressing environmental issues” (Brown 2009, 215). Brown’s view is not an unusual one. Public administration specialist Susan Buck (1997) has similarly concluded that environmental administrators and agency personnel typically have very little use for the philosophical proclivities of environmental ethicists. In Buck’s experience, this attitude is largely due to the institutional culture and politics of agency decision making, especially the role of administrative discretion: “Discussions of environmental philosophy and ethics have little impact on the routine discretionary choices of government bureaucrats charged with administering environmental programs. . . . Public administrators take an oath to uphold the Constitution, not Walden, however much they may approve of the sentiments in the latter” (Buck 1997, 8–9). In addition to these personal accounts, persuasive empirical evidence supports the judgment that philosophical environmental ethics has failed to break out of the confines of academic life and become a key player—or even an active participant—in the public realm. Legal scholar Christopher Stone conducted a revealing study of congressional and judicial databases in which he electronically scoured the record for explicit mention of environmental ethical concepts and authors. Stone...

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