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FIVE INFINITE THOUGHT INTRODUCTION In this chapter, we will move on to Hegel’s solution as presented primarily in the Science of Logic. Rather than moving to a quasitranscendental theory to attempt to supplement what is missing from classical logic, Hegel’s strategy is instead to try to set the categories of thought themselves in motion through recognizing that as well as the finite aspect of thought of the understanding, thought also has an infinite aspect that can only be understood as movement . The discussion will be divided into three parts. First, we will explore the basic aims of the Science of Logic and compare Hegel’s dialectic with Kantian transcendental logic. Second, we will see how the dialectic functions in the doctrine of essence. This will enable us to gain an understanding of Hegel’s conception of contradiction, as well as opening up discussions of essence and difference as they appear in the dialectical movement. These last two concepts will prove important in our analysis of Deleuze’s criticisms of Hegel and will also allow us to open up a Hegelian line of attack against Deleuze’s philosophy. Last, after having developed a positive understanding of Hegel’s concept of contradiction, we will return to the problems of Kant and Aristotle to show how these are resolved through reconceptions of the infinite and of the structure of the proposition. We will therefore begin by looking at the logical relations that hold between Kant’s project and Hegel’s alternative deduction of the categories of thought. KANT AND HEGEL We began our study of the relations between Hegel and Deleuze by looking at Deleuze’s relation to Kant, in order, on the one hand, to show that Deleuze belongs within the post-Kantian tradition, and on the other, to show how his own philosophy attempts to move beyond the limitations of transcendental idealism toward what he characterizes as a transcendental 125 126 HEGEL, DELEUZE, AND THE CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATION empiricism. In exploring Hegel’s project, we will similarly open with a survey of some of the key differences between the project of Hegel and that of Kant. This will allow us to see that Hegel’s project also emerges from a recognition of the problems to be found in representation and an attempt to overcome these problems. In criticizing Kant, Hegel takes a similar point of departure to Deleuze, namely, the problematic nature of Kant’s move from the structures of logical judgment to the categories of transcendental logic in the metaphysical deduction. Kant argues in the metaphysical deduction that “the same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding” (CPR B104–05). The metaphysical deduction attempts both to explain why this is the case and to trace exactly how the functions of judgment are related to the categories. This move will prove essential to the Kantian project, as once it has been established, Kant is able to go further in the transcendental deduction to show that the categories, which are derived from the functions of judgment can apply to objects of empirical experience, as these objects have been conditioned by the isomorphic transcendental categories. Thus, Kant considers himself to have moved beyond bare empiricism, on the one hand, and naïve metaphysics, on the other hand, which does not raise this question of the applicability of the categories to their object. Although Hegel presents several criticisms of Kant, in this chapter, we will focus on those of the metaphysical deduction, both because these appear to be the strongest criticisms that Hegel has to offer of transcendental philosophy,1 and also because in focusing on the limitations Kant places on the metaphysical deduction, it allows us to see how Hegel positively develops his own logic. Hegel’s relation to the metaphysical deduction is in fact quite ambivalent, and while he praises Kant for raising the question of the categories by “investigating just how far the forms of thinking are in general capable of helping us reach cognition of the truth” (EL, §41, Add. 1), ultimately Kant’s procedure proves problematic. Rather than focusing on the finite determinations of the categories that Kant’s deduction tries to uncover, Hegel wants instead to introduce movement into the process of the deduction of the categories by a renewed understanding of the...

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