In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

123 NOTES PREFACE 1. So as not to confuse: on Kant’s terminology, these would likely need to be called “sleights of the understanding.” I take the liberty of departing from that lexicon. CHAPTER ONE Epigraph. Burns Singer, Collected Poems, ed. James Keery (Manchester: Carcanet , 2001), 227. 1. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 154. Histoire de la sexualité I: La volonté de savoir (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1976), 204. 2. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I, 154; Histoire de la sexualité I: La volonté de savoir, 203: “au jeu du tout et de la partie” (my emphasis). 3. My account draws chiefly on Deleuze’s work on the concept in What Is Philosophy?, not on his critique of traditional philosophical notions of the concept in Difference and Repetition. However, it makes little use of the notion of a conceptual persona found in What Is Philosophy? 4. Definition from Roland Buser, Watch-Collector’s Paradise, http://www .datacomm.ch/rbu/J1.html. 5. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 22, 138. Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1991), 27, 131. 6. For a subtle and balanced assessment of this critique, see Catherine Malabou, “Who’s Afraid of Hegelian Wolves?” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 114–38. 7. See Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 49–50; Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? 50–51. 8. This is Foucault’s view, as well. See his “Ariane s’est pendue,” a 1969 review of Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, in Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, t.1 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 798: “To think intensities, rather (and sooner) than qualities and quantities; depths rather than lengths and breadths; movements of individuation rather than species and kinds. . . . We have always refused to think intensity in the West. Most of the time, we have reduced it to the measurable and the play of equalities; Bergson, for his part, to the qualitative and the continuous. Deleuze liberates intensity now, by and in a thought that would be the most elevated, 124 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE acute and intense. One should make no mistake about this. To think intensity—its free differences and its repetitions—is not a slight revolution in philosophy” (my translation). 9. For an important treatment of this topic, see Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 117. 10. Incidentally, if readers find it odd that in What Is Philosophy?, a book on the specificity of the philosophical concept, Deleuze takes the time to attack the contemporary occupations of marketing and advertising (see What Is Philosophy? 99; Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 95), this puzzlement can be quelled. The French equivalent of the occupational title “advertising copywriter” is concepteur-rédacteur or, roughly and literally, “concept-maker-editor.” Further, French advertising was undergoing a marked boom in social visibility in the 1980s and 1990s, with the profession becoming increasingly fashionable. In any case, in France there is a developed discourse on commercial advertising as a form of popular art, and French advertising agencies are playing a growing role in the globalization of contemporary marketing techniques. With respect to commercial creation in France, it is also easy to identify the work of individual advertising agencies, since television commercials and print advertising bear the “signature” of the agency that created them. Perhaps this context helps to explain Deleuze’s special effort to distinguish philosophical concept creation from the generation of commercial ideas in advertising. 11. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 19. 12. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 19. 13. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 19. 14. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 20. 15. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 20. 16. This is one of the examples of concepts for which Deleuze provides a graphic depiction. The depiction of concepts and their components in What Is Philosophy ?, though it is not without explanatory value, does nonetheless risk misleading for the reason that it may seem to suggest extensive construals of the essentially intensive things it depicts. 17. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 21. 18. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 25. 19. Justus Hartnack, An Introduction to Hegel’s Logic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 32. 20. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s “Science of Logic,” trans. A. V. Miller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1998...

Share