The Other Side of Gridlock: Policy Stability and Supermajoritarianism in U.S. Lawmaking

Notes

129 Chapter 1: Introduction 1. CQ Weekly, October 31, 2005. 2. CQ Weekly, April 3, 2006. 3. CQ Weekly, May 29, 2006. 4. Ibid. 5. CQ Weekly, September 18, 2006. 6. CQ Weekly, December 12, 2005. 7. Senate majority leader Bill Frist also voted against the cloture to merely preserve some procedural options. 8. CQ Weekly, December 26, 2005. Chapter 2: Gridlock and Policy Stability 1. Rescaled Score = 120 – (Original Score x 5). 2. Mayhew (2005) updates his list of significant legislation until 2002 (2005, 208–13). 3. Binder notes a similar finding (2003, 42). 4. For the variables of Binder’s and Edwards’s measurements, which are ratio variables constructed from grouped data, I model the variation using weighted least squares logistic regression for grouped data (Glogit). The Glogit function accounts for the variation in the denominator for the ratio variables. 5. By examining Congresses from 1946 to 1986, Kelly (1993) finds a moderate impact of divided government. 6. In contrast, Binder finds an impact of divided government regardless of the salience level of legislative agendas (2003, 68–73). 7. Except for laws in the tax policy area. 8. A nonprofit political organization advocating liberal and democratic values. http://www.adaction.org/voting.htm. n o t e s Notes 130 Chapter 3: Pivotal Interval Movement 1. Exceptions in postwar midterm elections include the 1998 and 2002 elections. In 1998, Democrats, helped by a superb economy, gained five seats in the House and maintained the same amount of senatorial seats. In 2002, Republicans gained seats under President Bush’s post- 9/11 popularity. 2. Measuredbytheresidualsfromtheequation,Votingdecision=c+b(Electorate ideology) + e. 3. Vice versa, the legislators’ preferences could influence the constituency ideology. The “issue evolution” study reveals that political elites’ opinion often drives mass opinion changes (Carmines, Renten, and Stimson 1984; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; Hetherington 2001; Layman and Carsey 2002; Brewer 2005). 4. Mayhewdiscusses“externalevents”,whichhaddirectimpactontheenactment of important laws (2005; 136–39, 217–19). According to Mayhew, examples of external events include Sputnik, the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, recession and energy crisis in the early 1970s, terrorist attack of September 11, collapse of Enron, etc. 5. Brady and Volden (2006, 116–20) compute the average scores of eighteen interest group ratings for the members of the 103rd House. The average ratings are highly correlated with the ratings solely by the ADA with the unstandardized coefficient 0.98. Poole and Rosenthal (1997, chapter 8) examine the 96th Congress and find that the D-NOMINATE scores are greatly related to the most commonly used interest group ratings, such as ADA, ACU, and ACA, with correlation coefficients near 0.95. 6. a = Q–{1/2(Q-Q’)} when Q > Q’, and a = Q’–{1/2(Q’–Q)} when Q’ > Q. 7. During World War I, the Senate filibustered a bill to arm commercial ships against attacks by German submarines. Displeased, President Woodrow Wilson called a special session of the Senate, which eventually adopted Rule XXII. 8. Before 1975, cloture required two-thirds of senators present. 9. Oleszek (2004, 283–84) offers similar postulation. 10. For the pre-cloture period, the distance between the most conservative and the most liberal members is measured. 11. More specifically, the bills in question are unfavorable for F and the members who are to the left of F, and for V and the members who are to the right of V. 12. The reflection point of q through F is F + (F–q). 13. The reflection point of q through V is V–(q–V). 14. The cartel agenda model assumes open rules on the floor. 15. Brady and Volden maintain a similar assumption (2006, 20–21). Chapter 4: Empirical Test 1. A nonprofit political organization advocating liberal and democratic values. http://www.adaction.org/voting.htm. Notes 131 2. Before 1975, the filibuster pivots under Republican and Democratic presidency are the 34th and 67th percentile legislators, respectively. 3. Poole places the House and Senate in the same space based upon the ideal points of the 615 legislators who served in both the House and Senate (2005, 192–95). Legislators who switched parties are treated as two individuals. Binder questions Poole’s assumption of a stable preference of a member across the two chambers (2003, 142–43). Nonetheless, Poole’s study shows that legislators...