Why Mars: NASA and the Politics of Space Exploration

Chapter Ten. Adopting “Follow the Water”

chapter ten Adopting “Follow the Water” Formulated at the end of the Clinton administration, the new “follow-the-water” Mars Exploration Program was adopted under President George W. Bush. The question at the conclusion of the Clinton years for Mars advocates was whether the political consensus favoring Mars would hold. Aiding in the transition to a positive decision was the Office of Management and Budget, which provided continuity in policy as administrations changed. Goldin’s successor as NASA Administrator, Sean O’Keefe, came from OMB and supported the new program . The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster of 2003 led to a decision by Bush to initiate a human spaceflight effort to the Moon and Mars. O’Keefe gave even more priority to the robotic Mars program as a result. As Mars became a higher priority, rival programs suffered in the budget wars, and there was significant conflict within the space policy domain. Opponents of what they regarded as too much Mars at the expense of other space science needs rose in rebellion. Implementation of the existing MEP progressed well, however. Mars advocates used the favorable NASA setting under O’Keefe to transform the flagship mission of the program, the Mars Science Laboratory, into an even bolder project. Change and Continuity On January 20, 2001, following the tumultuous aftermath of one of the closest presidential elections in history and a Supreme Court decision favoring him, Adopting “Follow the Water” 169 George W. Bush became president, with Dick Cheney as his vice president. Bush accepted Dan Goldin’s offer to remain as NASA Administrator until he found his own appointee. Goldin’s own power, so great under Clinton, diminished quickly under Bush.1 Mars, however, would do well in the presidential transition. Isakowitz pushed Hubbard and Garvin hard to refine their ideas. “The idea was to make our logic unassailable,” Garvin recalled. They spoke about funding and the sequence of missions in the 10-year program. “What would it take to get to Mars Sample Return?” Isakowitz asked. The Mars Smart Lander emerged as especially important in the progression of missions toward MSR. If the Mars Smart Lander was so important, Isakowitz said, “Why not send two?” Hubbard and Garvin, conscious of costs, did not accept the invitation to go that direction.2 In the long meeting, NASA and OMB officials discussed and debated various issues. It helped that Hubbard and his associates had gotten support for the new program from authoritative scientific advisory groups. The science endorsement had to be clear. But so did possible benefits in terms of successful missions for the new Bush administration. As always, MSR was central to the meeting, but it would not take place under even two Bush terms. OMB, responsive to the president, wanted to know what Bush would get for the money. Congress appropriated one year at a time, but OMB planned in five-year budget intervals. Hubbard was proposing a 10-year program. Budget options for the five-year projection included continuing the existing baseline, which was running approximately $350 million to $400 million a year; an increase over five years adding up to more than a half-billion dollars beyond the baseline; and expenditures even more ample that might accelerate MSR. After the meeting, there were more interactions between NASA and OMB, with Weiler now deeply involved, as the new officials took power at the White House and OMB. Isakowitz and his political superiors negotiated the Bush budget for NASA. Far and away, the most serious issue with which they dealt was a huge overrun afflicting the International Space Station. The NASA science budget was consequently an area where Isakowitz and his civil service associates had more leeway in decision making. In early February, Weiler informed Hubbard that the signs were positive from OMB for the Mars budget. On February 28, the Bush White House gave a preview of its budget plans, promising more details in April. The major consequence for NASA in general was the new administration’s decision to tackle the space station overrun through 170 Why Mars major cuts in that program. However, the White House left space science relatively untouched. For Mars, the verdict was to give its advocates everything for which they had realistically hoped. As Hubbard later wrote, “The celebrations in the Mars Program office could be heard to the end of the [NASA building’s...