Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration

Notes

n o t e s Chapter  • Introduction 1. the literature on terrorism studies has produced a series of noteworthy works on the peaceful transition of former armed-terrorist organizations. See Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End; Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence; Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism. Also, on how political wings affect the decision to relinquish violence, see Siqueira, “Political and Militant Wings”; dayton and Kriesberg, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding; Soberg Shugart, “Guerrillas and elections”; and deane, “Crime Corrupting Credibility.” 2. See Allison, “transition from Armed Opposition to electoral Opposition”; deonandan , Close, and Prevost, From Revolutionary Movements to Political Parties. 3. See chapter 3. Siqueira, “Political and Militant Wings,” 219. 4. Van engeland and rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics; Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. 5. Van engeland and rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics, 7–9, 183–185. 6. Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 21–22, 75–78. 7. downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 16–17. 8. See, for example, Brathwaite, “Other Side of the Coin,” 1–2, 6. 9. Van engeland and rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics, 5. 10. See, for example, Phillips, From Bullets to Ballots, 1; Allison, “transition from Armed Opposition to electoral Opposition,” 139. 11. Goodwin and Skocpol, “explaining revolutions,” 495. 12. ibid. 13. Quoted by McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, 26. 14. Gurr, “Causal Model of Civil Strife,” 1105. 15. Wood, Forging Democracy from Below; Goodwin, No Other Way Out; McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America. 16. Crenshaw, “Causes of terrorism,” 383–384. 17. deane, “Crime Corrupting Credibility,” 447; neumann, “Bullet and the Ballot Box,” 945–946. 18. neumann, “Bullet and the Ballot Box,” 947.  Notes to Pages – 19. Ottaway, “islamists and democracy.” 20. Finn, “electoral regimes and the Proscription of Anti-democratic Parties,” 52–53. 21. Hislope, “ethnic Conflict and the Generosity Moment.” 22. neumann, “Bullet and the Ballot Box,” 948. 23. For a more in-depth description of the “mainstream” understanding of political parties and armed groups as polar opposites, see Weinberg, “turning to terror,” 423–424. 24. Sinn Fein leader danny Morrison famously declared in 1981: “Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in the other, we take power in ireland?” (english, Armed Struggle: History of the IRA, 224–225). 25. eubank and Weinberg, “does democracy encourage terrorism?,” quoted in neumann , “Bullet and the Ballot Box,” 944. 26. rapoport and Weinberg, “elections and Violence,” 17. 27. de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians, 19–23. 28. Van engeland and rudolph, From Terrorism to Politics, 7. 29. Historical institutionalism is a specific approach to political sciences, one that focuses on understanding the shifts in political behavior and outcomes based on the analysis of the evolution of political institutions (see Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism?”). 30. Maney et al., “Past’s Promise,” 186. 31. Smooha, “Control of Minorities,” 256. Chapter  • The Power of Politics 1. deFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 7. 2. Milnor, ed. Comparative Political Parties, 19–22. 3. Siqueira, “Political and Militant Wings,” 219. 4. Broom and Selznick, Sociology, 238. 5. Wellhofer and Hennessey, Party Development, 136–137. 6. Panebianco, Political Parties, 17–20. 7. Scott, Organizations, 13. 8. downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 16–17. 9. Kriesi, “Political Context and Opportunity,” 81. 10. Klandermans, “Mobilization and Participation,” 586–588. 11. Clark and Wilson, Incentive Systems, 143. 12. downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 9. 13. Wilson, Political Organizations, 30–31. 14. rucht, “Movement Allies, Adversaries, and third Parties,” 197. 15. Clark and Wilson, “incentive Systems,” 158. 16. Pugh and Hickson, Writers on Organizations, 62. 17. Scott, Organizations, 69. 18. Wilson, Political Organizations, 263. 19. Clark and Wilson, Incentive Systems, 158. 20. Kriesi, Political Context and Opportunity, 69–70. 21. Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, 19. Notes to Pages –  22. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems. 23. ibid., 10–12; Lijphart, “Political Consequences of electoral Laws,” 482. 24. Lijphart, Democracies, 23–30. 25. Malapportionment is when there is a high level of discrepancies in the number of voters in each district, which concretely means that candidates running in districts with a higher number of voters need substantially more preferences to be elected, thus violating the principle of effective representation. Gerrymandering refers to the intentional drawing of electoral boundaries in ways that consistently favor a given party (taagepera and Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes, 14...