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2. Is There Really Peace among Democracies?
- Princeton University Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
2 Is There Really Peace among Democracies? BEFORE TRYING to explain what causes the democratic peace, we need to be confident it is real. Democracies do seem to fight less frequently, but we need to know if the difference is statistically meaningful and can withstand the scrutiny of detailed case studies. That is no simple matter. Although wars are commonplace in history, there is only a slim chance that any two countries will fight in a particular year or even a particular decade. The problem, then, is to determine whether the rarity of wars between democracies is statistically different from the rarity of wars in general. Even if we do find a difference, we have to consider whether it might be caused by some factors unrelated to democracy. Perhaps these countries are simply richer or lie farther apart. Variables like these affect the likelihood of all wars, regardless of what kinds of states are involved. Most studies control for several key variables known to affect the likelihood of war: the distance between two countries, their differences in military capabilities, their status as neighbors or allies, and the possibility that either is a Great Power.1 With controls like these in place, we can concentrate on the distinctive impact of democracy on war and peace. The empirical debate has been heated. That is perfectly understandable because the democratic peace has far-reaching implications for policy and theory. Yet the debate has also been useful and productive. As it has continued, the quality and richness of the analysis has deepened. The prominence of the issues has led to more intense inspection of the data, sharper specification of the models, and more sustained engagement over difficult conceptual problems. The result is a growing body of serious research. My goal in this chapter is to summarize this work briefly, explore how the debates have expanded beyond the central issue of war and peace, and ensure that any explanations I offer are focused on meaningful outcomes. Key Questions about the Democratic Peace The democratic peace was discovered by accident, doubted by those who found it, and overlooked by almost everybody else. The first empirical observation was in 1964 by Dean Babst, who published a brief article in a regional sociology journal.2 His conclusion was overlooked until 1976, when it was C HA PT ER 2 18 cited in another obscure journal by J. David Singer and Melvin Small, two of the most prominent quantitative students of war. Singer and Small dismissed the finding quickly—and prematurely—as an artifact of confounding variables, such as the greater distance between democracies.3 The issue was raised for a wider audience by Michael Doyle, writing in the early 1980s. In a series of major articles, he concluded that the democratic peace was both genuine and politically important.4 Doyle’s work is significant for two reasons. First, his was the most prominent early finding that liberal democracies do not fight each other. According to his data, there has been no such war since 1815—none at all. Second, drawing on the work of Immanuel Kant, he develops philosophical grounds for thinking this unusual outcome is no accident. His analysis is grounded in Kant’s 1795 essay, Perpetual Peace, which argues that monarchs are more willing to fight each other because they are safely removed from the awful costs. Citizens, on the other hand, are far less likely to take up arms since they would bear the costs themselves.5 Kant’s analysis, however, is not driven by costs alone. He also emphasizes constitutional restraints and democratic respect for individual rights, as well as commercial ties. Doyle concurs. He extends the analysis by stressing democracies’ respect for the moral autonomy of citizens and their legitimate right to choose leaders and policies. For Doyle, as for Kant, it is not simply voting that prevents war among democracies. What really matters is a wider set of liberal values, firmly embedded in stable political institutions. These rights include freedom of speech and conscience, political participation, and a cluster of economic rights, beginning with secure property ownership and freedom of contract. For Doyle, then, this is not so much a democratic peace as a liberal democratic peace. This important point has been embraced and extended by John Owen and others. When Doyle wrote, most international relations scholars were not especially interested in peace among democracies, liberal or otherwise. They were much more concerned about the dangers of war between capitalist democracies and...