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1 The Argument in a Nutshell DEMOCRACIES almost never fight wars against each other. This simple observation is one of the most powerful findings in international politics and one of the most throughly tested. But what explains it? The answer, I think, is that democracies have unique “contracting advantages,” which allow them to build stable, peaceful relations, based on multiple self-enforcing bargains. The basic finding—that democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other—is one of the most compelling in modern international politics. Discovered by accident and initially overlooked, the “democratic peace” has been vigorously debated and exhaustively tested. Most statistical studies and case histories have found the same robust relationship. Democracies often go to war but very seldom against each other.1 Thanks to all this testing, the democratic peace is now one of the bestestablished regularities in international politics, perhaps the best-established.2 The absence of war between democracies, Jack Levy concludes, “comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”3 Another recent article notes that when all interacting states are democracies, that is “a near-perfect sufficient condition for peace.”4 Not surprisingly, these findings have prompted a flurry of research. Some extend the initial conclusions, showing that democracies are distinctive in other ways. They generally win wars, for example, probably because they take special care in choosing opponents.5 Others show the limits of the democratic peace. New and unstable democracies may well be more war-prone than other states, although they, too, are reluctant to fight among themselves.6 This does not mean that democracies are pacifists, however, even when dealing with each other. They sometimes threaten to use force against fellow democracies, and they have come close to war several times. Even with these qualifications, the democratic peace is a powerful finding with far-reaching implications for both policy and theory. It means that international interactions are profoundly shaped by the way states are governed. Naturally , this finding inspires democracy’s many advocates. But it deeply puzzles theorists, who want to know why it occurs. Their puzzlement echoes an old academic joke: “We know it works in practice. Now we have to see if it works in theory!’ ” That is exactly the question about peace among democratic states. It works well in practice, but there is considerable confusion about how it works in C HA PT ER 1 2 theory. The lack of an answer is no joke, however. Despite extensive research, all we have is a remarkable correlation. We still lack a convincing explanation about why democracies do not fight each other. Knowing why they do not fight is important for both practitioners and theorists . It bears directly on two central issues of international politics: the reasons for war and peace and the problems of sustaining cooperation. It also has serious implications for any general theory of international relations. It poses a specially pointed challenge to those who deliberately ignore the character of domestic governments, a crucial simplifying assumption of neo-Realism.7 The answer to this puzzle may also say something important about how countries can build relationships of greater trust and reassurance, laying the foundations for enduring peace. In short, it is a prominent puzzle in every sense. How do we explain this apparent relationship between governmental forms and international outcomes? So far, three basic explanations have been advanced : 1. citizens’ reluctance to bear the costs of war; 2. shared values among democracies; and 3. unique domestic institutions, which restrain elected leaders. The cost explanation, initially developed by Immanuel Kant, argues that citizens of a republic are less war-prone because they must bear the burdens themselves and can vote to avoid them. Monarchs and dictators, by contrast, can shift the costs of war onto their subjects, who have no voice in the decision.8 The normative explanation, also suggested by Kant, is that liberal democracies share certain basic values, grounded in their domestic political life. They settle disputes through neutral courts rather than through blunt force or status differences.9 They place a high value on individual life and liberty. As they look abroad, they recognize that other democracies also have governments based on popular consent and hold similar values. They then apply these liberal values in dealings with other democracies, where they can expect reciprocity.10 Relying on these common values, they can adjudicate disputes and compromise voluntarily rather than resorting to military force.11 Finally, the institutional explanation underscores the...

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