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C H A P T E R T W O A Movement in Theory EARLIER, I MADE TWO BROAD CLAIMS: that social-movement theories are derived from a research approach that is flawed because it relies only on positive cases, and that the “movement” for gun control is not much of a movement at all. Here I connect those two insights by demonstrating that conventional social-movement theory cannot explain the nonmovement for gun control. Through a brief sweep of history, I show that gun control appeared to have all the makings of a social movement, not just once, but at a handful of pivotal points in time. Yet no movement arose. From this exercise, I conclude that there is something missing from conventional movement theory. But what? In the second part of the chapter, I develop a theory capable of answering that question. The theory is derived from an analytical case comparison of three issues that have inspired movements and one issue that has not. Gun control is the negative case. The three positive cases are the movements against alcohol, against smoking, and against abortion. These three cases were selected because they are similar to gun violence along key dimensions, except that they have clearly inspired movements. These cases, and the theory derived from them, are the subject of this chapter. Readers who are interested in gun control more than social-movement theory may read the section in this chapter dealing with gun control’s “movement moments” and then skip to chapter 3. CONVENTIONAL SOCIAL-MOVEMENT THEORY Social-movement theory is derived from studies of social movements. At first glance, this seems quite logical. After all, theory is derived from observable actions. Yet, the scientific method tells us that good theory depends crucially on variation in what is observed. Traditionally, socialmovement scholars have obtained variation by examining the waxing and waning of activists’ success over time. These scholars have assumed that the background condition—group-based grievances—is more or less steady. Given human beings’ penchant for oppressing other human beings , there is no shortage of potential movements. The research question therefore becomes, What factors must be in place to cause a potential 32 • Chapter Two movement to become an actual movement? Social-movement theory is rich and varied, but a gathering consensus based on numerous case studies suggests that three factors are fundamental to this shift: collective efficacy; mobilizable resources; and political opportunities. Collective efficacy comes when disenchanted individuals, first, recognize themselves as a group with a shared grievance and, second, believe that collective action can reduce or eradicate the source of that grievance. William Gamson refers to these two prongs as identity and agency.1 Doug McAdam refers to them as “cognitive liberation.”2 When groups possess collective efficacy and are thus primed to act, social-movement theory holds that they require resources to translate emotion into collective action . Typically, “resources” refers to money, volunteers, and the nongovernmental organizations that provide them.3 More recent studies have broadened the understanding of resources. John McCarthy refers to “mobilizing structures,” which include not only formal organizations but also activist networks, affinity groups, memory communities, protest communities , and movement schools.4 Sidney Tarrow likewise sees informal resources as central to movement formation.5 These include social networks , temporary assemblies, and connective structures. Synthesizing these perspectives, William Gamson and David Meyer note that a social movement is a “range of actors pursuing numerous strategies,” an amalgam of “organizations and advocacy networks,” and “a field of actors, not a unified entity.”6 Although some scholars have argued that institutionalization is the death knell of social movements, most accept that organizations are fundamental to sustained campaigns for political change, for without an organizational infrastructure, the expression of mass grievances is limited to quick outbursts of anger rather than sustained, strategic political pressure for legislative and social reform.7 Finally, possessing collective efficacy and access to human and financial resources, social-movement leaders require a political opportunity when collective action stands a better-than-average chance of paying dividends.8 In a synthesis of various social-movement theories, Doug McAdam argues that there are two types of opportunity that matter for movement-building purposes. The first is political opportunities: “(1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) The presence or absence of elite allies; and (4...

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