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CHAPTER FIVE 1958:PROTESTANT REACTIONS TO THE 13MAI AND THE COMING OF DE GAULLE On 11 January 1958, the internationalization of the Algerian conflict came a step closer when a French army patrol was attacked near the Tunisian border. Fourteen French soldiers were killed and five more taken prisoner. Paris charged Tunis with complicity in the attack and demanded the immediate return of the captives. President Bourguiba not only rejected this demand but refused even to receive the emissary sent by France to negotiate their release. French commanders in the field were determined to retaliate for what they were convinced was official Tunisian collusion with the FLN. On 8 February, responding to anti-aircraft fire which had been coming from inside Tunisia just across the Algerian border for many days, French planes bombarded the Tunisian town of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef at market time, killing sixty-nine civilians and wounding 130 others, including some Algerian refugees who were being looked after by the International Red Cross. The officers who directed the attack had not bothered to get prior authorization from their civilian superiors, most notably Resident-General Lacoste, who was understandably outraged when the news reached him. Writing in Cite nouvelle, Jan Czarnecki speculated that, apart from seeking military retaliation, the perpetrators of the assault were anxious to put an end to what had appeared to be a rather promising opportunity for detente between Paris and Tunis. The left-wing journalist expressed the hope (in vain as it turned out) that the bombardment would be followed by mass protests throughout France.1 The Sakiet incident was a significant moment in the evolution of the Algerian conflict for three reasons: it exposed the impotence of French civil authority in dealing with the military who were determined to wage war on their own terms after what they saw to be a political sell-out following Dien Bien Phu; as a corollary, it undermined the legitimacy and credibility of the Fourth Republic (Yves Courriere notes: "It was at Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on 8 February 1958 that the death-knell of the Fourth Republic first sounded");2 and, because of the clear violation of the air space of newly independent Tunisia, it forced the issue of France's continuing presence in Algeria onto the United Nations' agenda. Tunisia's President Bourguiba, whose hold on power was less than absolute, took his grievance about the attack to the Security Council of the 109 110 The Call of Conscience United Nations where, given the American desire to outdo the Soviet Union in championing the cause of decolonization, Washington would be under pressure not to offer Paris unconditional support. Enormous strains were thus imposed on the Atlantic Alliance and, to avoid its rupture, the United States, supported by Great Britain, offered its "good offices" to resolve the tension between Tunis and Paris. The subsequent presence of the veteran American diplomat Robert Murphy outraged the European minority which saw this as just another signal of their forthcoming abandonment by the home country in the face of American and third-world manipulation. The Sakiet incident and its aftermath evoked considerable comment in the pages ofReforme. Paul Adeline remarked that the crisis had once again made clear that France was unable to deal with the Algerian problem by herself. Her diplomatic isolation during the crisis and the feeble state of her economy made it necessary to review the situation which could best be resolved through a comprehensive North African arrangement involving Morocco and Tunisia.3 The managing editor of Reforme, Pierre Bungener, agreed with this view, suggesting the creation of a Franco-African federation, an "occidental Mediterranean community" which could, among other things, undertake a common exploitation of Saharan oil resources.4 Albert Finet wondered why a night raid by commandos had not been used in response to the FLN assault at Sakiet; the air raid against innocent civilians which had been launched instead reminded the editor ofReforme of the indiscriminate kind of aerial bombardment used by Americans in the 1940s. Finet concluded that the whole unhappy episode had resulted from the visceral reaction ofamiddle-level civil ormilitary officer whohad not thought through the consequences. Some expression of regret by Paris together with an offer to compensate the victims would no doubt have limited the subsequent damage in France and her interests.5 In the 6 March issue of France-Observateur, Andre Philip offered a devastating indictment of the government's Algerian policy. Under the title "Le suicide de la France...

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