Animal Welfare and Human Values

Sixteen: The Philosophy of Animal Protection

276 Animal Welfare and Human Values relevant. If racism means the discrimination of treatment on the basis of race this hypothetical distinction of capacity would justify racism. If racism, on the other hand, implies arbitrary discrimination this hypothetical distinction would not justify arbitrariness. No fact could justify arbitrariness, but that is because of the nature of arbitrariness. In the case of racism and sexism what is objected to is that people sometimes do make arbitrary distinctions, i.e., they consider the person's skin colour or gender as indications of lesser intelligence or cultural inferiority. Because they are wrong in their assumptions they are wrong in their attitudes and behaviour. In this case the facts do not justify different treatment and different rights. Yet in the case of animals the distinctions of facts with regard to intelligence do justify, on Singer's own acknowledgement,different treatment and different rights. Speciesism is not only justified but Singer himself is a speciesist. Now, of course, it will be retorted that what speciesism implies is that one should not make arbitrary or unjustified distinctions. But that can only mean that one should take into consideration the relevant differentiating facts in determining how to treat animals. And who would deny that? The point is that there are relevant differentiating facts—unlike the cases of racism and sexism—and the task is to determine what they are. For Singer, the sole consideration is the degree of pain—at least most of the time. Sometimes it is 'suffering' and sometimes the quality of a life—which, we suppose, could be decided by applyingthe criterion of potential for pain or suffering. By contrast Tom Regan suggests there is an "inherent value" to all beings "who have an individual experiential welfare, logically independent of their utility relative to the interests or welfare of others." He acknowledges that a line has to be drawn somewhere and concedes that "where one drawsthe line between those animals who are, and those who are not" to be included in the category is certain to be controversial.17 Once an animal is included in the category , distinctions of potential for pain or suffering are irrelevant. What matters is the "inherent value" of each and every animal. We have two concerns with this approach. First, it treats the animal realm, again, as though it were composed of individual animals in the same manner that modern Western human society consists ofindividual persons. From our experience we would suggest that much wildlife does not see itself in terms of "individual experiential welfare" but in terms of itself as the natural extension of others, as part of a cohesive whole whose individual interests cannot be separated from the group interest. We would, moreover, suggest that is probably also how primitive humans saw themselves, and how modernhumans would see themselves 17 Tom Regan, "Ill-gotten Gains," in Langley, Animal Experimentation, pp. 29, 38. The Philosophy of Animal Rights 277 if modern conditions had not so warped their natures that they became mere autonomous individuals. The second concern lies in Regan's concession that a line must be drawn somewhere. Regan is conceding that all within count equally, those without not at all, with regard to "inherent value." But the drawing of the line anywhere would suggest that there are degrees of value and that would suggest distinction of treatment along some continuum. We would certainly not regard the rights of a spider or a mosquito as equivalent to those of, say, a fox but we do feel that they have some kind of value. We will kill a mosquito if it is biting though we would prefer to discourage its presence. We do not kill spiders in our home but we do remove them. This is not a thought-out philosophical respect for the rights of mosquitos or spiders but merely a natural distaste for killing. What we find frustrating about the writings of such eminent philosophers as Singer and Regan is that they tell us so little about the relationship of their abstract principles to concrete reality, and we are unable to assimilate them to our experiences without being so informed. We can only fully understand abstract principles if we can test them against our feelings, our intuitions. This does not mean that such abstract principles cannot inform, or extend, or alter our feelings. They decidedly can, but only when we understand them for what theyimply. As Edmund Burke said before he acquiesced in a principle, "I...