The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: The Role of Workforce Programs

2 State Approaches to the Recovery Act’s Workforce Development Provisions

21 2 State Approaches to the Recovery Act’s Workforce Development Provisions Burt S. Barnow George Washington University This chapter examines the general approach that states and local workforce agencies took in planning and initiating workforce investment activities with Recovery Act funding. As will be discussed in the chapter, states and localities were strongly encouraged by the USDOL to begin spending Recovery Act funding quickly after they were notified of their allocation—and to make certain that expenditures adhered to Recovery Act requirements and provided long-term benefits to worker and employer customers of the public workforce system (i.e., through the WIA, Wagner-Peyser/ES, and TAA programs). The chapter describes early planning and start-up of Recovery Act–funded activities , organizational and staffing responses to the availability of Recovery Act funding, training approaches and technical assistance activities involved in initiating Recovery Act–funded employment and training activities, early patterns of states’ expenditures of Recovery Act funds, and changes made while the Recovery Act funds were being spent. EARLY PLANNING AND START-UP All state and local workforce agencies mentioned that the time they had to plan and initiate Recovery Act–funded activities, from the time the president signed the Recovery Act into law in February 2009 until they first began spending Recovery Act resources on employment and training services (as early as April 2009), was very short. States had to 22 Barnow move quickly to begin spending Recovery Act funding within a matter of weeks after being notified of their Recovery Act funding allocation in March 2009. There was strong pressure on states and local workforce agencies to spend Recovery Act funding rapidly (if possible, front-loading expenditures into the first year of the two years available) and, at the same time, to spend the resources wisely. In particular, states and local areas indicated that they were under intense pressure to plan and implement WIA Summer Youth Programs, which in many localities either had not been operational or served small numbers of youth because of a lack of program funding. These programs had to ramp up and be fully operational (and capable of serving thousands of youth in some urban areas) within a few months (by no later than June 2009). For many states and localities, this meant recruiting large numbers of organizations (government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and forprofit firms) willing to hire youth temporarily for the summer, as well as reaching out to youth and certifying their eligibility to participate in the programs. As is discussed later, when asked about their greatest early accomplishments with Recovery Act funding, many state and local officials pointed to their rapid start-up of the WIA Summer Youth Program and their ability to place hundreds or thousands of youth in summer jobs so quickly. While states and local workforce agencies were pushing quickly to initiate or expand their WIA Summer Youth Programs, they were also digesting the rules and regulations for spending Recovery Act funds in other programs (e.g., the WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs, the Wagner-Peyser Employment Service Program, Reemployment Services [for UI claimants], Trade Adjustment Assistance, and the UI Program ). For example, workforce programs were exploring ways to do five things: 1) increase the number of customers receiving training, 2) offer new and innovative training options in high-demand occupations, 3) expand services available to unemployed and underemployed customers , 4) respond to a surging volume of customers in One-Stop centers , and 5) improve data systems to track Recovery Act expenditures and produce better reports on program results. Table 2.1 provides several accounts from states of their quick responses to the sudden availability of Recovery Act funding. However, as noted later, some states expressed concern that in a few instances guidance from the ETA was slower than they would have liked. State Approaches to the Recovery Act’s Provisions 23 One reason states were able to respond quickly is that they had heard that Recovery Act funding might become available in early 2009, and governors and state workforce agency staff proactively began planning how to react if funding did become available. Second, as soon as the legislation was enacted, state workforce agencies immediately identified agencies and staff (generally, existing administrators) to be involved in planning the state’s response, and they formed steering committees to help with planning and overseeing Recovery Act implementation . As discussed later in this chapter, states also relied upon...