Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule

Chapter 3

43 CHAPTER THREE Channeling a “Limited” Resource in Cuba And the Internet, you know, has done a lot to bring democratic capitalism to other parts of the world. It was instrumental . . . in bringing down the Berlin Wall. It was instrumental in having students protest the policies in East Berlin. . . . CNN, the networks, and the Internet were instrumental in the demise of the old Soviet Union. And we think the same thing should happen in Cuba. —James Courter, former Republican member of Congress, June 5, 2000 More than a decade after Cuba first began to experiment with computer networking, the spotlight has begun to shine on the country’s experience with the Internet. Internet-industry publications have highlighted the efforts of foreign entrepreneurs developing e-commerce applications for the country’s tourist industry.1 Newspapers and broadcast media from the Washington Post to the BBC have reported on the government’s Internet access restrictions and on those enterprising Cubans who circumvent the rules to obtain unofficial connections.2 Cuba has responded to less-thanfavorable coverage of its Internet policies with scathing editorials in the state media while also publicizing its own efforts to extend public access to a national intranet.3 As with almost every other aspect of the country’s development, the issue of the Internet in Cuba has become intricately intertwined with Cuba’s foreign relations (and U.S.– Cuban relations in general ), and it has grown increasingly polemical over the years. The use of ICTs to promote political change is deeply rooted in the U.S. policy toward Cuba, and as Internet development has proceeded in the country, expectations about the medium’s political effects have been greatly influenced by the conventional wisdom on the Internet’s impact in authoritarian regimes.4 Unsurprisingly, Cuban authorities have not accepted the conventional wisdom that the growth of the Internet will inevitably bring political change to the country. On the contrary, they have attempted to steer the development of the medium along a course that will bring benefits in priority 44 OPEN NETWORKS, CLOSED REGIMES areas while avoiding potentially subversive or destabilizing effects. In choosing such a course, Cuba has much in common with other authoritarian regimes that are addressing the issue of Internet development, including each of the countries we examine in this book. Still, Cuba is also distinctive among authoritarian regimes in the specific approach it has taken toward the development of the Internet. Most other authoritarian regimes have followed a market-led model of Internet development, allowing the proliferation of Internet access through cybercafés and residential dial-up accounts while blocking web sites, conducting surveillance, and promoting self-censorship. For its part, Cuba has eschewed such a rapid, market-led model of Internet diffusion. On the contrary, Cuban authorities have carefully planned out the diffusion of the Internet within their country, controlling the medium’s pace of development and the sectors in which Internet access is granted. Cuban authorities seek control over the Internet not through a massive, centralized censorship mechanism but rather by denying Internet access where it could be potentially subversive. Despite its atypical approach to Internet diffusion, Cuba resembles other authoritarian regimes in that it has proactively guided the development of the Internet to serve specific social, political, and economic goals. The government has long endeavored to harness computer networking for education and public health, and it is also rolling out a national intranet to bring the benefits of connectivity to the masses without granting full access to the Internet. Cuban authorities aggressively promote Cuban tourism on the Internet, and they are encouraging foreign investment in a growing number of e-commerce ventures. In charting its approach to Internet development, Cuba has looked to China as a model of state control over the medium, and it is actively seeking Chinese cooperation in that area. When forming a new Ministry of Computing and Communication , says its director, Cuba “took into account the experience of China, which is the other place where the state has played the role that it has played here.”5 Chinese investors have helped to modernize Cuba’s aging national telephone system, and the head of China’s Ministry of Information Industries has stated that “China will play a decisive role in the improvement of Cuban telecommunications.”6 In this chapter we argue that Cuba’s approach to the Internet has allowed its authoritarian regime to limit the medium’s potentially threatening impacts while gaining tangible benefits from its diffusion. If the...