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Ethics
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Ethics Shalom Rosenberg M y purpose is to attempt to apply certain. modern categories to the study of classical Jewish ethics. This is a dangerous enterprise, because we are entering the minefield of anachronism. Nevertheless, I think it can produce fruitful results. I would like to show first of all that in classical Jewish philosophy there are several different ethical theories, four of which will be discussed here, namely, the deontological, teleological, and anthropological ethical theories, and ethics conceived as imitatio. Let us begin with a general description of the first type, which may be called the deontological theory. It is based on the premise that we cannot reduce moral value to natural goodness, happiness, and sufferance. Rather, there are considerations that render an action right or wrong other than the goodness and badness of its consequences. The reasons for ethical conduct involve neither convenience nor utility. This type of theory presents us with a moral code that applies to human actions. The code is gener~lly defined by a system of positive and negative commandments, as in Moses Maimonides ' Sefer ha-Mip'ot (Book of the Commandments). 196 ETHICS We find two different but complementary explanations of the deontological theory of ethics. The basis of the theory is above all halakhah, which has its roots in the biblical commandments. But in Jewish philosophy in different periods and among different thinkers there are philosophical explanations of these commandments that are based on an intuitive grasp of moral values, of right and wrong. This type of theory is manifest in Saadiah Gaon's Sefer Emunot ve-Deot (Book of Beliefs and Opinions), a work influenced by stoic ideas transmitted via the Mutazilite version of the Kalam. Kalam. Moral precepts may be considered as rational precepts, that is, as having their roots in a rational intuition. We can speak, therefore, of the first type of ethical theory as that of natural law. Religious ethics are natural ethics, because they may be learned not only from revelation but also through the discoveries and intuitions of unaided human reason. At this point we must be careful to distinguish between this kind of rational intuition and what we might call emotive theories. Medieval Aristotelians spoke of moral values as mefursamot, that is, as almost universally accepted propositions that fail, however, to convey rational meaning. These mefursamot exhibit an emotive quality that is irrelevant from a rational and scientific point of view. The mefursamot do not represent a normative theory but rather a descriptive theory of ethics and, indeed, of aesthetic values as well. As is generally known, Maimonides accepts the theory of the mefursamot and expresses it through his interpretation of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Garden of Eden. Maimonides explains that when Adam ate the forbidden fruit he had an immediate comprehension of this kind. As a result he became subject and subjugated to these emotions. According to Maimonides, although we are bound to some kind of moral conduct, as was Adam, the emotive component of our conduct is a burden that was imposed upon us as a result of the original sin. In other words, human beings exhibit moral values that have an emotional base. They react emotionally to actions and events. These reactions are almost universal. We must, however, emphaSize the word almost, as there are societies and, of course, individuals whose scales of values are totally different. Sexual mores represent the prime example of this type of relative value system. The mefursamot therefore represent a philosophical descriptive theory. The theory describes a situation that is always emotional, mostly useful, but at times harmful to society and to individual development. As we shall see, this interpretation of the source of ethical values does not prevent Maimonides from attempting to present a normative theory of morality. Even so, [44.200.240.205] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 06:28 GMT) ETHICS 197 Maimonides sometimes utilizes the descriptive theory as if it had normative import. It should be emphasized that Maimonides distinguishes carefully between what one may call values and norms, or, more specifically, between descriptive values and prescriptive norms. In Book 1, Chapter 2, of the Guide of the Perplexed we read that man "in his most perfect and excellent state" possessed intellectual cognitions, but had no faculty to grasp the mefursamot , the generally accepted notions-even the most manifestly evil, namely, nudity. Later, in Book 3, Chapter 8, Maimonides asserts that our values must be changed...