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123 18 The Nicotine Fix Whatever his inclinations, Matt had little time and less focused energy , as the negotiations moved into May 1997, to reach out to disturbed but still open-minded activists in the field like Karla Sneegas and Tim Filler; no time to explain patiently how he had come to be at the negotiating table, why he had proceeded as he had, and within what constraints he was forced to work. His primary focus was on the negotiations themselves, which had reached a critical, demanding stage. In Matt’s view, three issues remained either unresolved, or deeply troubling, as the negotiations moved into May and early June: Assuring unrestricted FDA authority over nicotine; developing strong lookback penalties—the penalties the companies would have to pay if they failed to meet the established percentage targets for reducing teenage smoking; and preventing any agreement on industry liability that would amount to immunity. As if these issues were not difficult enough, in the last weeks of the negotiations, Matt found himself fighting them on separate fronts simultaneously . Outside the negotiations, he was fighting to get expert help in the FDA negotiations from a silent David Kessler and a stonewalling Department of Health and Human Services and FDA. Inside the negotiations , he was fighting to get the strongest possible authority for FDA to regulate and eventually to move the market to a position where either the health risks were virtually eliminated or nicotine levels controlled to minimize addiction, based on the best available science and technology. He realized that he did not know the right scientific answer , but he wanted to be sure FDA had the authority to get that answer and act on it. Outside the negotiations, he was fighting those critics who considered any concessions to the tobacco companies on liability unacceptable . Inside the negotiations, he was fighting to restrain the attorneys general, the trial lawyers, and the White House—all so eager to reach 124 Smoke in Their Eyes settlement they were prepared to make concessions on liability that Matt held unacceptable. Within his own Center for Tobacco-Free Kids, he was wrestling with the entreaties of the younger lobbyists who worked most closely with him. They, with increasing fervor, were urging him to walk away from the negotiations. They feared that the attorneys general and the trial lawyers were so eager to reach agreement that they would override Matt’s objections and accede to the very industry demands that Matt held unacceptable—leaving Matt to face the accumulated wrath of all those who already expected the worst from the negotiations. In the early weeks of May, the negotiations had come to a standstill. The negotiators remained far apart and obdurate on the liability issues. They had yet to tackle the most critical public health issues: nicotine regulation and the form and formula of the look-back provisions . And, as Matt recalls, “All sorts of games were being played among the negotiators; people were very angry at each other as well as the other side.” At that moment, Matt was called by Dick Scruggs and asked to join Scruggs, Mike Moore, and some others, including Washington State attorney general Christine Gregoire, in a small meeting in New York with a few of the industry negotiators to see if a way could be found to jump-start the negotiations. During a break at the meeting, Matt pressed for resolution of the nicotine issue: “I privately spoke, separately, to Steve Parrish and Meyer Koplow [the principal negotiators for Philip Morris]. I said we had to solve the nicotine problem; we weren’t anywhere near close to agreement ; we couldn’t dance around it any longer. And I said that I couldn’t bring back any deal without nicotine regulation in it.” The next evening, at Parrish’s invitation, Matt and Chris Gregoire had dinner in a private room in a private club atop Grand Central Station with Parrish and Philip Morris lawyer Marc Firestone. The elegant setting was “a little bizarre” for public interest advocates, recalls Matt, “but Chris and I talked candidly about our determination to give FDA complete authority to regulate tobacco products, including nicotine. They talked about their fears of de facto bans.” As a result, when the larger negotiations resumed on May 19, the negotiators set up several smaller working groups. Gregoire took the chair of the negotiating group on the remaining public health issues, joining with Matt and Massachusetts assistant attorney general Tom Green. Massachusetts attorney...

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