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196 chapter 7 giving to and taking from the cabildo The Politics of Giving after 1806 On 5 January 1809, Interim Viceroy Santiago de Liniers urged the cabildo of Buenos Aires to come up with 100,000 pesos to pay the troops. This request hardly surprised the city councilmen, as they had been financing the viceroyalty’s military expenses since 1806. However, there was something unusual about the viceroy’s imperative request. Instead of offering the situado as collateral, which had already been pledged to back the cabildo loans, he proposed to exchange the funds he had requested for silver bars and nuggets deposited in the royal treasury. The city councilmen responded that they would do their best to collect 100,000 pesos among the vecinos, although they were certain that it would be almost impossible, as “specie had become extremely scarce in Buenos Aires due to the increased number in expenses and sacrifices made by the vecinos since the terrible year of 1806.” In any event, the cabildo commissioned regidor and merchant Francisco de Telleechea to visit the royal coffers to estimate the value of the silver bars and nuggets. Later on that day, Francisco de Telleechea reported back that only about 54,000 pesos was in bars and nuggets with the remainder in “challises and other sacred ornaments previously belonging to the Jesuits.”1 Viceroy Liniers’s vital need of funds stemmed from the fact that a few days earlier, creole, black, and casta militias had been deployed to keep a conspiracy led by Martín de Alzaga from fully unfolding. Alzaga was a Spanish merchant and outspoken defender of the monopolisttrade faction. Counting on the support of other powerful men and the Spanish militias, he had planned the ousting of Liniers for 1 January 1809. Alzaga and his supporters distrusted Liniers not only because he was a Frenchman and advocate for neutral trade but also because he opposed demobilizing the popular militias deployed to expel the English. giving to and taking from the cabildo 197 Viceroy Liniers’s exchange with the cabildo of Buenos Aires provides perhaps the best summary of the political and financial situation of Buenos Aires at the beginning of 1809. First, the militias created and deployed during the British Invasions had not been discharged. Instead, they had become powerful political players and a permanent burden on the city finances. Second, while Viceroy Liniers enjoyed the political and military support of the popular militias, he was financially dependent on the cabildo. Finally, monopolist merchants who clustered in the cabildo of Buenos Aires not only opposed Viceroy Liniers’s popular politics and budgetary largesse but also his support for trade with neutral nations. These and other circumstances impacted the collection of new donativos in 1808–1809 and 1810 and thereafter changed the politics of giving. As discussed in the previous chapter, the military expenses that followed the British Invasions were paid for by donativos, the new excise tax, and loans brokered by the cabildo of Buenos Aires. At the local level, the payment of these expenses facilitated the distribution of income from wealthier to poorer vecinos primarily in the form of pensions, salaries, and dowries. Similarly, the institutional changes that followed the invasions of Buenos Aires made it possible for the popular militias to engage in politics more frequently by utilizing channels not available to them in the past.2 Between both British Invasions, popular militias had been deployed to decide the fate of Viceroy Sobremonte, and in 1809 they supported Viceroy Liniers against Alzaga and his faction. In other words, popular militias found in local politics a new role that transcended their military service. On July 1809 Viceroy Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros arrived in Buenos Aires to replace Liniers. He held a permanent appointment and came directly from Madrid, the center of monarchical patronage. His authority was legitimate, and his presence should have resolved the leadership crisis that began with Sobremonte’s ousting and the subsequent rise of Liniers. As illustrated by the cases of Governor Viedma and Viceroy Avilés (discussed in the previous chapters), collections of large donativos within the districts they served evidenced their capacity for leadership. The collection of new donativos provided Liniers and Cisneros with similar opportunities to gauge their leadership skills. In this chapter, I argue that military service coupled with their role as beneficiaries of the politics of giving enfranchised the militias. Thereafter , popular militias not only enjoyed economic and political rights but also embraced their duty...

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