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166 chapter 6 “dollars of buenos aires” The first section of this chapter discusses the Atlantic and local circumstances that made possible the transformation of the cabildo of Buenos Aires into the legitimate political and fiscal authority in the region. It is followed by an analysis and discussion of the extraordinary revenues collected by the cabildo during the British Invasions. Finally, this chapter compares the viceregal and municipal politics of giving. the rio de la plata in 1806: war and foreign invasion The cycle of warfare beginning in the early 1790s continued into the nineteenth century. Although the Naval Wars against England ended with the Peace of Amiens in 1802, two years later Spain was again at war with Britain and facing even deeper financial disruptions. Diplomatically, France’s preeminence over Spain became increasingly clear. Napoleon, consul of France since 1799, recognized Spanish Trinidad as a British possession in 1802. When hostilities between France and Britain resumed, Napoleon, seeking to raise funds, sold Louisiana to the United States, disregarding previous agreements with Spain to never dispose of that territory. Spain managed to maintain its neutrality (at least throughout 1803), though at a high price. Through a secret revision of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, Napoleon demanded that the Spanish Crown provide an annual subsidy of £3 million and allow French vessels to be resupplied at Spanish seaports. Despite this support, England respected Spanish neutrality. But in 1804, when Napoleon planned to invade Great Britain and counted on Spanish military assistance, Great Britain declared war on Spain.1 The continuation of Atlantic warfare into the early nineteenth century created new challenges for the viceroys appointed to the Rio de la Plata. Since the territorial defense and internal security of the area were largely left in the hands of militias, at times of war local officials feared “dollars of buenos aires” 167 a British invasion of the Rio de la Plata. From the mid-1780s onward, viceregal authorities reported their concerns to the Spanish court and repeatedly requested reinforcements, weapons, and military supplies. Local military leaders recognized that the number of professional troops and the available equipment were below the standards established by military regulations. For instance, in 1799 Rafael de Sobremonte, who by then served as subinspector general of regular troops and militias (subinspector de armas), unsuccessfully requested the posting of 1,059 additional men to complete the number of troops required in the area. In 1802 Sobremonte insisted on this matter, adding in his missives that men from this region were both uninterested in joining the military and reluctant to fulfill their militia service.2 As demonstrated in the prior chapters, by the early 1800s the rewards and potential for advancement that had made careers in the military and militias attractive had become harder for creoles to obtain. This second exchange between Sobremonte and the minister of war additionally reveals that even under the threat of foreign invasion, the Spanish Crown was unwilling to finance long-term improvements to the existing defensive system in the Rio de la Plata. After all, the Spanish American subjects had successfully repelled the English attempts at seizing Cartagena (1741), Manila (1762–1764), and Havana (1761–1762) by relying on local financial and human resources. Unlike creoles from the Rio de la Plata, Subinspector General Sobremonte was fully committed to advancing his military career by using all the means the Spanish imperial system offered to ambitious officers. In addition to his training and his professional assessment of the military situation in the area, which he systematically reported to the court, he contributed, voluntarily, 4 percent of his salary in donativos in 1799.3 Still, in 1802 he had not yet been able to make it onto the list of military men who would advance to the rank of field marshal. Thus, after contributing donativos, he drafted a petition requesting his promotion. Two years later he was finally rewarded not only with the rank of field marshal but also with an appointment as viceroy of the Rio de la Plata, a position he held until 1807. While serving in the highest military and political office in the region, Sobremonte tried for a third time to obtain additional military reinforcements from Spain, arguing that in the event of an invasion, it would be dangerous to arm creoles and castas. Once again, the war ministry turned him down. However, Sobremonte’s assessment of the invasion threat and the risks of heavily relying on plebeian militias proved accurate. [18...

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