Ambassador Ortiz: Lessons from a Life of Service

7: Mexico for a Second Time: A Successful Negotiation

Not much had changed in Mexico in the three years we had been away. There was a pleasant new president, but the autocratic, corrupt, statist system still prevailed. My special task in Mexico the second time around involved a serious, longstanding border dispute. Ambassador Mann believed that if we failed to solve this problem it would permanently damage our relations with Mexico. Resolving the issue became my number one priority. The situation had come about because of a shift in the course of the Rio Grande in  that cut off a largish chunk of Mexican territory and placed it on the United States side of the river. The Mexicans wanted it back, but it wasn’t so simple to execute a transfer , since the land in question was soon developed as part of downtown El Paso, Texas. Through decades of contention, the U.S. had consistently refused to return the parcel. The two governments finally agreed to arbitration by an international tribunal, headed by a Canadian. The tribunal’s decision in favor of Mexico in  directed the United States to return the land, but by then American interests had been building on it for  years and the U.S. ignored the tribunal’s finding—a position our enemies in Mexico never stopped trumpeting.  7 Mexico for a Second Time: A Successful Negotiation The disputed real estate was called the Chamizal. When I was given the assignment, I was told that if the problem wasn’t solved very soon, the solution would never happen and the damage to bilateral relations would be permanent. I pointed out to Ambassador Mann that, as a second secretary, I lacked the clout to negotiate with high level Mexican officials and American business and political leaders involved with the issue. I was concerned that no one would take me seriously. The Ambassador acknowledged my handicap but still wanted me to do the job. He flew with me to El Paso to help me establish relationships with the real sources of power in the region. We met with Samuel Young, a very powerful owner of one of the biggest banks and companies in El Paso, and several others, telling them that settling the dispute would probably involve transferring de facto U.S. territory back to Mexican ownership. We asked for their support in our endeavor. Young promised his support but admonished us, “For God’s sake, keep it secret until we have a deal, because if it gets out that we’re talking about giving land to Mexico, you’ll never get away with it.” From El Paso, the Ambassador and I flew to Austin to meet with Governor John Connelly, who was in the hospital with a hernia. At a meeting around his hospital bed, he said he would support us but agreed that we should keep the negotiations secret. We continued on to Houston, where we obtained assurances of backing from other power brokers, including the publisher of the Houston Post, a man named Hobby. Vice President Lyndon Johnson also endorsed our endeavor. Again, the consensus was that we should not make anything public until we were sure we would be successful. With access to these powerful mentors, I spent a couple of years working on the Chamizal settlement. I traveled back and forth between El Paso, Washington, and Mexico City, working closely with Joe Friedkin of the International Border and Water Commission. We began meeting secretly with the Mexicans. My primary contact in Mexico was Vicente Sanchez Gavito, who was already an Ambassador. Sanchez Gavito and I got along well, although initially to get something to him I had to go through the Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello. I acquired a stack of Esso maps of downtown El Paso to use  CHAPTER SEVEN during negotiations. I’d draw a line on a map, suggesting that the U.S. could pass to Mexico a certain portion of land. The Mexicans would look it over and come back with a counter offer, and so forth. These were strictly informal discussions that we could always deny having, especially since all the proposals were on unofficial maps. The proposals and counter-proposals went to the foreign minister through Pepe Gallastegui, a guy my age who was very helpful. We began making progress and after a while it began to look as if we were going to reach agreement. As time went on, I assumed...