The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations

Chapter 3 Prime Minister Satō, Former Prime Minister Kishi, and President Nixon

The prime minister crosses the Rubicon According to Kusuda Minoru (the prime minister’s right-hand man and adviser throughout the Satò administration), Satò’s general position on the Okinawa problem could, at the beginning of March 1969, be summarized as follows: 1. Both the White House and State Department are increasingly aware of the need to resolve the Okinawa problem speedily in order to maintain healthy U.S.–Japan relations. 2. Nevertheless, the Pentagon, and some members of Congress’ securityrelated Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, remain reluctant to allow a quick reversion. The hard-line view favoring maintaining the status quo over the bases, should reversion occur, is still strong. 3. Reversion will probably occur within three years. Consequently, although Prime Minister Satò has secretly instructed Foreign Ministry officials to negotiate for a “homeland-level” reversion, this only amounts to a “political decision”—in effect, a basic negotiating position —and there is no firm guarantee that this can be achieved. This is Chapter 3 Prime Minister Satò, Former Prime Minister Kishi, and President Nixon also clear from the prime minister’s observation to North America Bureau Director Tògò—namely, “If I can’t resolve the matter within this framework, I will be forced to make an important decision.”1 Undoubtedly, Kusuda’s observations were correct. The current orthodox view is that the prime minister abandoned his “blank-slate” position at the March 10 Upper House Budget Committee session, in response to a question from JSP [Japan Socialist Party] representative Maekawa Tan. Kusuda’s account documents the prime minister’s response: Maekawa Tan: Even if you bar Polaris nuclear submarines from entering Okinawa’s ports, surely this will have hardly any effect on the functioning of either the American bases or their strategic weapons systems? Prime Minister Satò: Common sense suggests that there’s no need for us to let Polaris nuclear submarines enter Okinawa’s ports or those of the mainland. Consequently, under the prior consultation system, it would be easy to refuse such a request. After all, we operate under the three nonnuclear principles and are opposed to the introduction of any nuclear weapons. I will negotiate [with the Americans] on this matter with this firmly in mind. Maekawa: Doesn’t the same apply to the B-52s used in transporting strategic nuclear weapons? The Prime Minister: If Okinawa is returned, we will not allow B-52s equipped with nuclear weapons. Maekawa: In light of the political drawbacks [of storing nuclear weapons], it would surely also be in America’s interests if Japan didn’t have nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister: If Okinawa is returned to Japan, the efficiency of the bases cannot be maintained without the support of the people of Okinawa —support that will be absent if the bases house these much despised weapons. I’m all too well aware of this problem and, naturally, intend to raise it [in the negotiations]. Nogami Gen (JSP): On a related matter—since the U.S. Army in Japan is qualitatively different from that in Okinawa, won’t this require a revision of the Security Treaty once reversion occurs? The Prime Minister: A continuation of the role of the Okinawa bases in their present form would constitute a major development—one that, I suspect, would be impossible without revising the Security Treaty. In Satò, Kishi, and Nixon 65 other words, it makes sense to apply the Constitution and the Security Treaty to Okinawa once it is returned. This is the commonly held view, and it is natural and straightforward to conclude that any change would require corresponding revisions. The die, in effect, had been cast, and the prime minister had, with this historical reply, crossed his personal and the country’s Rubicon. Since the prime minister’s departure from his “blank-slate” policy was entirely unanticipated, there was intense media activity, with the evening papers excitedly reporting the news. At a press conference following the Budget Committee session, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori made clear that “after reversion, we will apply the three nonnuclear principles to Okinawa,” thereby emphasizing that the government had committed itself to negotiations for a “denuclearized, homeland-level” reversion. Clearly then, Prime Minister Satò’s announcement (in the context of the lengthy debate on the Security Treaty and Okinawa that followed the 1967 October talks between Satò and Johnson) was a decisive step forward in the Japanese government’s stance toward the...