The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations

Chapter 2 Denuclearized Reversion: The Prime Minister’s Decision

The declaration at the Japan–U.S. Kyoto Conference After returning from Washington on January 18, 1969, other than a single meeting with Prime Minister Satò five days following my return (and a report to former prime minister Kishi), I devoted all my energies and activities to the success of the Japan–U.S. Kyoto Conference, in my capacity as a member of the Okinawa Bases Problems Research Council (Okinawa Kichi Mondai Kenkyûkai or Kichiken—the Bases Research Council). This Japan–U.S. Kyoto Conference on Okinawa and Asia1 was held at Kyoto International Hall and organized by the Japan–U.S. Kyoto Conference Executive Committee (in actuality the Bases Research Council). It generated widespread interest in Japan, prompting several demonstrations by Zengakuren (the National Federation of Student Self-Government Associations) and extensive reporting in the media. In America as well, the conference received significant attention. In retrospect , however, the conference’s direct impact on the decision processes of either the Japanese or American governments was smaller than it was claimed at the time. In particular, our program was not as successful as Chapter 2 Denuclearized Reversion: The Prime Minister’s Decision we had anticipated in influencing the United States. The main reason for this was that the U.S. government, since the conference was a private and not a public event, had decided not to send an official representative . As became increasingly obvious, under the Nixon administration private citizens had very little influence on the policy process, no matter how famous they were as scholars or former high-level politicians . Nevertheless, at the time all the participants viewed the conference as a great success. Indeed, all of us, notably Òhama Nobumoto2 and Suetsugu Ichirò, made considerable efforts, and the conference was far from a failure. First, during the preparatory stages of the conference, discussions within the Bases Research Council became more concrete, and a broad consensus emerged as every member expressed his opinions more candidly. Without such discussions, the contents of the report issued by the Bases Research Council, on March 8, would certainly have been far more abstract. Second, extensive media coverage allowed us to exert considerable influence on public opinion in our country, although such media coverage also had its dangers. The conference reports, written jointly by the six American and Japanese participants, addressed three topics— namely, “Peace in Asia: U.S. and Japanese Roles”; “The Okinawa Situation with Reference to Bases and the Reversion of Administrative Rights”; and “Okinawa Reversion and U.S.–Japan Relations”—all of which adopted a generally moderate tone. Since the conference debates themselves remained confidential, with only the reports being published , the mass media overestimated the pacifist sentiments of the conference participants. Both the American and Japanese sides, in producing the chairman’s report on the final day of the conference, expressed their concern at this possible misunderstanding. A categorical endorsement of a “denuclearized, homeland-level” reversion could easily be interpreted as demonstrating that reversion was both possible and easy to realize. Since this was by no means the case, the final report was deliberately guarded, and consequently the media correctly noted that while a “denuclearized, homeland-level” reversion had been established as a policy aim, it certainly would not be simple to achieve. Third, even if the conference’s influence on the U.S. government was small, its success can be measured in terms of the considerable impact it had on the Japanese government. Prior to the report by the Bases Research Council issued in March, a paper by Kusumi Tadao on the 50 Denuclearized Reversion second topic (“The Okinawa Situation with Reference to Bases and the Reversion of Administrative Rights”) significantly foreshadowed the major orientations of the final report. Kusumi’s analysis proposed a “homeland-level” reversion in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Mutual Cooperation Security Treaty of 1960, including the application of the prior consultation system.3 Fourth, two well-known American military specialists, the distinguished nuclear strategist Professor Thomas C. Schelling (of Harvard University) and Professor Albert J. Wohlstetter (University of Chicago), were uncompromising in expressing their doubts on the strategic benefits to be obtained from the storing of nuclear weapons in Okinawa. This was quite unexpected and a welcome surprise for the Japanese participants . Wohlstetter, known for having coined the expression “delicate balance of terror” in nuclear deterrence theory, was closely affiliated with the Rand Research Institute, based in Los Angeles and...