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Chapter 11 A “Nuclear-Free, Homeland-Level” Reversion by 1972
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Okinawa will be dealt with on day one Prime Minister Satò and his entourage left Haneda Airport at 10:04 a.m. on November 17, amid driving rain and elaborate security arrangements, and flew via Anchorage, Alaska, arriving in Washington on the same day, local time. Because of time differences and the international dateline, they reached Washington virtually at the same time as they had left Japan. On landing at Dulles International Airport, the prime minister made a brief statement. In Washington, the Japanese delegation also encountered a small group of demonstrators (a number of whom were Japanese) protesting against the Vietnam War and apparently focused on raising the awareness of people in Washington oblivious to the visit of the Japanese prime minister. Mr. Satò’s group drove to the official residence of Ambassador Shimoda on Massachusetts Avenue and there rested and refreshed themselves after their lengthy journey. Glancing through the morning papers on the 18th, my attention was caught by a report filed from Anchorage by a journalist accompanying the prime minister. The story, while describing the prime minister as retChapter 11 A “Nuclear-Free, Homeland-Level” Reversion by 1972 icent and preoccupied with his own thoughts, also indicated that on some issues he had been “surprisingly frank,” adopting a firm position on pushing for a nuclear-free reversion while also criticizing those Japanese participating in anti–Vietnam War demonstrations in Washington . Perhaps the prime minister had unconsciously revealed his true feelings in expressing his relief that his mission was finally under way. In addition, this news reinforced my hope that the prime minister and President Nixon would manage to meet on common ground. The Japanese bureaucratic team in the negotiations (including Tògò Fumihiko, bureau director of the Foreign Office’s North American Affairs Bureau) had already arrived in Washington and were involved in final sessions with their American counterparts. Apparently the situation did not leave much room for optimism for rapid progress, particularly on the textiles issue, which the Japanese side publicly pointed out was overlapping with the nuclear question. At 9:40 a.m. on the 18th (7:40 p.m. on the 17th in Washington), I received an international phone call from “Dr. Jones.” “We’ve decided,” Kissinger began, “that the Okinawa issue, including the question of nuclear weapons, is to be dealt with on day one. The conversation will start out along general lines, but hopefully they can deal with the nuclear question in its entirety during the course of their talk. They ought to be able to dispose of 90 percent of the details relating to the ‘small room’ [the confidential agreed minutes] on day one.” “At that time we may,” I noted, “bring up the subjects of Mace Bs, the hotline, and CB weapons.”1 “All right. Day two will be concerned with textiles. We think there are three possible approaches: to continue along the same lines as the preparatory negotiations currently taking place in Geneva; to adopt a twin-track approach; or to suspend the talks in Geneva after a week or ten days for an intermission in which separate talks could be pursued in secret before reconvening the Geneva talks to conclude the matter. We would be happy with any of these approaches and want ‘your friend’ to select the one that suits Japan best. ‘My friend’ would need to know in advance which approach has been chosen. Whichever approach this happens to be, we would like your friend to be the one who raises the issue. Could you also ask him how much reference can be made to economic issues in the communiqué?” I was privately troubled that, at this late stage, they should still be indicating their desire that Prime Minister Satò bring up the subject of textiles. I was not at all happy with the situation but did not think this 254 “Nuclear-Free, Homeland-Level” Reversion [54.173.221.132] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 22:22 GMT) was either the time or the context in which to say so directly. Instead I merely observed, “The State Department appears very insistent in demanding that all economic issues, including textiles, be included in the communiqué.” Kissinger retorted, “It is not the State Department but the American government that wishes to see them included.” “ ‘My friend’ contacted me just before he left for the United States and pointed out that if the Americans were genuinely very eager that the communiqué contain a general reference indicating that trade and...