The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations

Chapter 8 Conveying Prime Minister Satō’s Counterproposals

Eliciting a decision from the prime minister By the time I met with the prime minister on the morning of October 23, the preparations for the summit were approaching completion. Our meeting started at 9:20 a.m. and lasted for about half an hour, taking place in the same room as usual in the official residence. The prime minister was very eager to learn whether I had received any communications from the United States. He told me that in the discussions at the diplomatic level a few problems remained aside from the nuclear issue, and he pointed out that they were still awaiting answers from Ambassador Meyer and that a formal channel needed to be established. I told him in no uncertain terms that no answer would be forthcoming on the nuclear issue, reminding him of my earlier report and indicating that no matter how long he waited, he would not receive a response through diplomatic channels. Undoubtedly the official diplomatic route was important, but given that we were talking about a summit between heads of state, I questioned the need for a hard-and-fast agreement at this level beforehand since the issues could be resolved only by the two premiers. I reminded him that Kissinger himself had made this clear and Chapter 8 Conveying Prime Minister Satò’s Counterproposals then switched the subject to textiles, pointing out that the Americans had proposed bilateral negotiations through the official channel. The prime minister hesitated before responding, “I do intend to discuss it [the textiles issue] but only through GATT. I understand Nixon’s position. We are both politicians and ought to be able to discuss the matter. Any news on the reaction to Trezise’s report the other day? I must hear what the experts have to say.” I suggested that the issue might be more pressing than he was implying, pointing out that the strength of Kissinger’s request on behalf of a president concerned to maintain his reputation surely indicated that the Americans wanted the prime minister to intervene personally. The issue was not, I argued (repeating a point that I had made when I had returned from the United States), a matter to be dealt with at the diplomatic level. The prime minister gave no clear response, and our conversation seemed to stall at this point. I resumed the discussion by bringing up the nuclear issue, saying that we would almost certainly be able to achieve a nuclear-free reversion of Okinawa but asking how he planned to define a future emergency situation. The Americans were, as a minimum condition, seeking a guaranteed right under crisis conditions to reintroduce and transport nuclear weapons across Okinawan territory and wanted this right to be binding on Mr. Satò’s successors. The prime minister suggested that the issue might be resolved informally, based simply on trust and understanding between the two countries. However , I made clear that the United States required something in writing and that for him to oppose the suggestion might jeopardize the entire negotiations. Satò responded that even a written agreement might not be binding upon his successors and that any decision regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons would be governed by the prevailing power balance between the United States and Japan. As I sought rapidly to make sense of what the prime minister was saying, he asked me when I would be able to return to the United States. I pointed out that I would be able to go only if I had received a clear response from him. Arriving empty-handed seemed to me pointless. Satò indicated that he appreciated what I was saying but that some time would be required before a proposal then under development would be complete. I inquired about the nature of the proposal, but he asked me to be patient until he had had a chance to talk with Ambassador Shimoda , due to return from the United States. This, he explained, would require waiting at most until the 4th or 5th of the following month, and he suggested, therefore, that I consider possibly going to the United 186 Conveying Satò’s Counterproposals States sometime between November 5 and 10. Mindful of the morning ’s press reports, I said I would leave on the 6th, remain in the United States until about the 10th in order to meet my opposite number, and then report back to the prime...