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 8 Japan as an Outsider The basic premise of our foreign policy since leaving the League of Nations continues to be support of world peace. —Takahashi Korekiyo, 1936 When he wrote his memoirs during the grim years of the Pacific War he had sought to avert, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew chose the date of 20 February 1933 as the end of one chapter and the beginning of another, with these words: Nobody could miss the political significance of Japan’s decision to quit the League of Nations. It marked a clear break with the Western powers and prepared the way for Japan’s later adherence to the Axis. But the immediate consequence of Japan’s departure from the League was not a swing toward extremism either in domestic or foreign affairs. Quite the opposite. Having made their hostile political gesture toward the Western powers, the leaders of Japan took a line that looked almost like appeasement—at any rate as far as the United States was concerned. But in spite of its apparent moderation, Japanese foreign policy remained unyielding on essentials: the Naval Limitation Treaties were not renewed , more Japanese troops poured into China. But events did not move fast enough to suit the militarists. The longer the period of calm, the more intense the storm.1 Grew’s paragraph encapsulates a very important historical debate concerning Japan’s foreign policy intentions and behavior in the 1930s. Should we go with the “clear break” thesis or accord substance to the “line that looked almost like appeasement ”? Standard accounts, both in Japan and the West, posit the Manchurian Incident as the turning point from a stance of international accommodationism to one of aggressive autonomy. In many quarters, it is cited as the opening volley of a “Fifteen-Year War” that did not end until 1945. Historian Sandra Wilson weighs in with her thorough study of responses among several levels of Japanese society to the events in Manchuria and concludes that most Japanese, even those in govern- Japan as an Outsider  ment, were not conscious of the tidal change that writers commonly assign to attitudes of the time. She notes that Japan remained a participant in the Disarmament Conference of 1932–1934 and joined in the World Economic Conference in 1933. She asserts that, for Japanese, the Manchurian affair had an ending and that after 1933 Japan sought to improve relations and expand economic ties with the powers. In Wilson’s words, the connection between the events of the early 1930s and the development of increasingly authoritarian and militarist social and political structures is more complex than is commonly imagined; . . . the situation was more fluid than is often acknowledged, containing the possibility of outcomes other than those which did in fact occur; and . . . while the Manchurian Incident can be seen as a milestone in Japanese militarism, this is an interpretation which rests heavily on hindsight.2 With regard to Japan’s political relationship to the League of Nations, the Manchurian crisis is undeniably consequential. In this study, Manchuria is indeed a turning point. But the end of League membership did not mark the demise of internationalism in Japan. It did not mean that Japan believed it could ignore world opinion or the community of powers as it formulated its policies. True, internationalist thinkers had to move beyond the institution of the League and find new formulas—cited in the following pages—to promote international comity. The inability of the League of Nations to serve as the designated orchestrator of world order was, after all, acknowledged with regret by internationalists in all countries in the mid-1930s. Rather than marking a sharp break with the past, the Manchurian affair gave expression to trends that had long-standing roots and had been building for some time. Among them were the gravitation toward regional understandings for peace and order and the preference to address differences with neighbors on a bilateral basis. Also, in the affair itself and its aftermath Japan demonstrated its compulsion to seek accommodation with the powers and achieve respect as a world citizen. In the wake of 1933, Japanese adherents to internationalism pursued their cause with renewed energy. Post- Japan and the League of Nations The government had correctly calculated that the League would stop short of applying economic and military sanctions against Japan. By the time Japan’s withdrawal became effective in two years, Rehe (Jehol) had been incorporated into Manchukuo, and Japan had negotiated with the Nationalist government the Tanggu...

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