Generals and Scholars: Military Rule in Medieval Korea

1 The Military Coup

9 1 The Military Coup In the eighth lunar month of 1170, as Koryŏ’s monarchŬijong was visiting several Buddhist temples, General Chŏng Chungbu, head of the palace guards, together with his aides, Executive Captains Yi Ŭibang and Yi Ko, launched a coup that toppled Ŭijong from power and left a number of powerful officials dead. This revolt was not a random act but the result of many forces that exploded in the calm of an autumn excursion. To understand this coup in all its complexity, a search into its origins is imperative. The coup was much more complicated than a simple armed revolt caused by incensed military officers. Its roots go back to the early days of the dynasty as military officers found themselves forced to yield their authority to civilian leaders. In the early twelfth century, when military officers discovered they were becoming the arbiters of civil disputes, they became less willing to accept rebuke from civilians. As Ŭijong’s court became seriously split over royal prerogatives and as the king became less and less attentive to state matters, the military officers launched their coup. Role of the Military The status of the military had been in decline ever since the founding of the kingdom. Koryŏ’s founder, Wang Kŏn, established his kingdom through military force, sharing his power with his key generals . But to stabilize the dynasty and rule through a strong central government, the Koryŏ court soon pursued a policy of civil supremacy . Koryŏ’s military leaders, slow to accept this system, staged a 10 Generals and Scholars coup in 1014 in a last-ditch attempt to reassert their deteriorating positions. Although the effects of this coup lasted less than half a year, it manifested both the military’s discontent over the policy of civil supremacy and its revived political consciousness. Rather than soothe military egos, civilian leaders continued to assert the ideal of civil supremacy. When the dynasty confronted invasions along its northern frontier, it was civil officials who led the dynastic armies: Kang Kamch’an (948–1031) checked the Khitan and Yun Kwan (d. 1111) fought the Jurchen. Similarly, when Sŏgyŏng (the Western Capital, present-day P’yŏngyang) rose in revolt in 1135, it was the renowned scholar Kim Pusik (1075–1151) who charted strategy. As civil officials continued to assume the authority of military commanders , they relegated military officials to supporting roles. Military and civil officials were separated by tension. And although the civil arm dominated, the military’s needs and demands could not be dismissed. At the end of the eleventh century, when one of the dynasty’s most prominent officials, Yi Chaŭi, sought to arrogate his authority in 1095, his key opponent, So T’aebo, managed to stay one step ahead of him by winning the support of several generals. Without the crucial backing of these military officials, such as Wang Kungmo, So T’aebo would not have been successful in defeating Yi.1 Events in Injong’s reign (r. 1122–1146) reveal the ambiguity of the military official in Koryŏ. Two major rebellions, the Yi Chagyŏm and Myoch’ŏng revolts, seriously taxed the dynasty and forced the civilian officials to rely on military support to secure their control over dynastic institutions. Both rebellions exposed the myth of civil supremacy.2 Despite this charade, the dynasty effectively isolated military officials from major civil positions and decision making. As Hugh Kang has observed: The area of duty saved for the military officials was strictly con- fined to the field military units where they served as the commanders of the six Wi [guards] and two Kun [armies], and where the technical skills of the professional soldiers were presumably best utilized for the most effective result. It is evident that the military officials were completely barred from positions of political responsibility in the early Koryŏ government.3 Military officials had harbored a long list of grievances for generations . Certainly their economic position had deteriorated.4 From The Military Coup 11 the tenth century, to the detriment of military officers, the dynasty had favored civil officials in its prebendal allotments. In 1076 a final revision of the land stipend law (chŏnsikwa) appeared. Although the net impact was to reduce the prebends...