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148 When Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn came to power in 1196, he inherited an unstable economic structure. The court was almost without funds. Eleven years earlier, in 1185, the Koryŏsa indicated that the royal granary was nearly empty even though it was receiving all the tribute presented from foreign exchanges. In the next year, with the dynastic granary again drained, the kingdom borrowed gold and cloth to cover salaries. With the deterioration of state finances, people began expanding their private landholdings through a number of ploys, such as dispatching their slaves, acquiring dynastic patronage, or merely expropriating property.1 As we have seen, Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn launched reforms in many areas of government administration. Fiscal restraint was an important part of his approach. Unless he restored fiscal solvency, his entire program would collapse along with his authority, relegating him to the same fate that beset his predecessors . Sound policies focusing on the land would alleviate some of the burdens confronting the peasants and win their support. Decisive fiscal action would also assure Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn adequate funds to support the dynasty and his own private structure, thus solidifying the loyalty of his followers. Above all, Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn needed funds to pay the officials in the government. To cover these demands he could rely on the land stipend law (chŏnsikwa), inheritable private lands (sajŏn), and the salary system (nokpong).2 He also needed ample finances to cover the costs of public administration—and could again look to the stipend land system, other public land allotments (kongjŏn), and revenue 8 Land and Other Economic Issues Land and Other Economic Issues 149 from taxation. But Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn also needed funds to cover his own personal expenses. He required wealth to pay his loyal followers , his retainers (mun’gaek), and other personal attendants. He also had his own administrative costs and expenses to bolster his autonomy and authority. Here Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn turned to the land stipend system, using both public (kongjŏn) and private (sajŏn) holdings for his personal advantage. By occupying dynastic offices, he received a fixed grant under the salary system and prebends under the land stipend system. Since these incomes were regulated according to one’s government rank and in any case were insufficient to cover the myriad costs of the Ch’oe House, Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn had to turn to other sources of income. By gaining control over large tracts of inheritable land and organizing estates, he acquired dependable sources of income. The sigŭp—a prebendal system that based allocations on the number of households instead of land area—offered another source of income. Other means of augmenting personal finances included investments in temple projects, the ownership of slaves, and trade. But to utilize these various sources of income, Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn needed to bring stability to the country and revitalize both the land system and the tax structure. We have already noted his endeavors to pacify slave and peasant discontent and thus ensure tranquility in the kingdom. Here we will look at the role of finances in guaranteeing the success of his rule. Ch’oe Fiscal Policy: Land The key to Koryŏ finances was land. During the tumultuous period that marked Myŏngjong’s reign, not only were many peasants forced off the land because of excessive land levies but powerful figures took land—removing it from the tax registers and encroaching on the land stipend system. In theory, enforcing earlier land system designations and resettling the uprooted would allow peasants to till fields and pay taxes. This accomplished, revenues could be remitted to the government to cover salaries and expenses, and prebends could be made to officials holding collection rights under the land stipend system. Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn started to adopt this order, but there was a flaw in this scheme: the Ch’oe House had very specific needs distinct from those of the dynasty. Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn needed to revitalize the land stipend system to support officials, but he also [18.216.32.116] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 04:45 GMT) 150 Generals and Scholars needed to expand his own private holdings to cover his burgeoning expenses. The net result was that the Ch’oe House pursued a diverse and somewhat conflicting policy that can best be understood from the vantage...

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