Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis

Chapter Eleven. Madhyamika Transcendentalism

Chapter Eleven Madhyamika Transcendentalism Madhyamika is one ofthe most widely studied schools ofBuddhism. Studies by Western, Indian, and Far Eastern scholars are too numerous to mention. One of the most authoritative and widely acclaimed analyses of Madhyamika thought is T. R. V. Murti's The Central Philosophy oj Buddhism,1 where the author compares Madhyamika thought with that of Immanuel Kant in Western philosophy. This study is largely based on Nagarjuna's Miilamadhyamakakiirikii and Candrakirti's commentary on it, the Prasannapadii Miidhyamikavrtti. According to our analysis ofearly Buddhism and the subsequent development of Buddhist thought, the theory of an Absolute came into existence only after the Buddha's demise and reached its culmination in the Prajniipiiramitii literature. The origin of dialectical consciousness which finally culminated in the full-fledged Madhyamika dialectic, as pointed out in chapter ro, was the conflict between noumenal reality and phenomenality that is very vividly depicted in the Prajniipiiramitiis. On the other hand, the two Buddhist schools Sarvastivada and Sautrantika, inter alia, contributed to the emergence of the Madhyamika school when they presented metaphysical theories in their attempt to explain the nature of the phenomenal world. The Miilamadhyamakakiirikii ofNagarjuna is devoted mostly to a refutation of the metaphysical theories of these two schools, and, as we have seen, the Theravada school of Ceylon had little or no direct influence on the development of Buddhist schools in India.2 The Miilamadhaymakakiirikii begins with a statement and a refutation of each of the four metaphysical theories of causality presented by the Buddhist schools, as well as the non-Buddhist schools current during Nagarjuna's time. They are: (I) self-causation or self-production (svata utpatti), (2) external causation or production by external factors (parata utpatti), (3) both self- and external causation (dviibhyiim utpatti), and (4) noncausation (ahetuta utpatti).3 I29 In chapter 9 it was pointed out that the Buddhist school of Sarvastivada as well as the non-Buddhist school ofSankhya presented an identity theory of causality (satkiiryaviida), and this is the first of the four theories mentioned by Nagarjuna. It was the theory found in the iitma-tradition, the Sarvastivadins themselves falling into this category as a result of their conception of 'substance' (svabhiiva), although they claimed that they belonged to the aniitma-tradition. This becomes evident from Nagarjuna's own analysis. After enumerating the four theories of causation, Nagarjuna examines the first. He refers to the theory of causal correlations (pratyaya) which was formulated by the Abhidharma schools and later also by the Yogacara school,4 implying that it was the first of the four causal theories, namely, self-causation (svata utpatti). This is further confirmed by the third quatrain, where he points out that "the substance (svabhiiva) of the existents (bhiiva) is not to be found in the different causal factors or correlations (pratyaya)."5 This certainly was a criticism of the identity theory of causality (satkiiryaviida) presented by the Sarvastivadins, for it is they who insisted on the identity of cause and effect based on substance or 'inherent nature' (svabhiiva). But according to Murti, the identity theory of causality (satkiiryaviida) criticized by Nagarjuna is that of the Sankhya school. For him, it was the Vaibha~ikas, a school of Sarvastivadins, who presented the nonidentity theory of causality (asatkiiryaviida). But the Sankhya school did not present a theory of causal correlations (pratyaya) of the like criticized by Nagarjuna. For these reasons it is clear that the identity theory presented and criticized by Nagarjuna is none other than the causal theory of the Sarvastivadins. For Nagarjuna, 'substance' (svabhiiva) was a metaphysical principle , just as 'self' or 'soul' (iitman) of the Upani~ads was for the Buddha. Candrakirti, elaborating on Nagarjuna's criticism, points out that if the 'substance' or 'own nature' of the effect were to be found in the cause, production would be rendered meaningless (vaiyarthya),6 for there would then be mere self-duplication, not the emergence ofa more prominent factor which is not already existent. A seed would produce only another seed, not a tree, which is of a different nature. It is possible to counter this criticism by maintaining that the tree is found in the seed in potential form and that it becomes actual later on; in other words, there is a difference in state, but identity of 'substance'. The views expressed by the four Sarvastivada teachers (see chapter 9) seem to be directed toward just such a 130 LATER BUDDHISM [18.223.171.12] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 09...