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Chapter Four The Three Characteristics of Existence In chapter 3 it was pointed out that the Buddha's discourse pertained to two aspects of reality, namely, causality and the causally conditioned phenomena. According to his teaching, there is nothing in this world that does not come within the realm of the causal law. Causality explains the arising and passing away of things. Hence, the direct corollaries of the theory of causality are that all things in this world are (I) impermanent (anicca, Sk. anitya), (2) unsatisfactory (dukkha, Sk. dubkha), and (3) nonsubstantial (anatta, Sk. anatman). These three characteristics were emphasized because the Eternalist theory, which dominated the philosophical atmosphere during the time of the Buddha, held that the reality in phenomena was the immutable 'self' or 'substance' (atman). The theory of impermanence in Buddhism has been generally misunderstood because it came to be confused with a later theory known as the 'doctrine of moments' (k$al}avada), which was formulated from a logical analysis of the process of change (paril}ama) by the later Buddhist scholars belonging to the scholastic (Abhidharma) tradition. But such a theory is conspicuous by its absence in the early discourses. Therefore, although there were statements in the early discourses that could be interpreted as a theory of momentariness, statements such as "There is no moment, no inkling, no particle of time that the river stops flowing," 1 the most important view was the one which recognized that a finite segment of time constitutes our immediate experience. The theory of impermanence as stated in the early texts could be correctly described as an empiricist theory. A passage found in many of the discourses runs thus: "Impermanent indeed are the compounded [i.e., conditioned] things; they are of the nature of arising and passing away. Having come into being, they cease to exist. Hence their pacification is tranquillity." (Anicca vata saizkhara uppadavayadhammino, uppajjitva nirujjhanti tesal'Jl viipa- samo sukho.)2 According to this statement, things are impermanent not because they are momentary, but because they are characterized by arising (uppiida) and passing away (vaya). An extended definition is sometimes met with in the early texts which analyses the process ofchange into three stages: arising (uppiida), passing away (vaya), and decay or change of what exists (thitassa annathatta).3 The theory of moments may be derived from a logical analysis of this decay or change (thitassa annathatta), which literally means change of what exists. But even here the change is not commuted in terms of moments. Whatever is born is considered to be impermanent since it is sure to perish. In short, impermanence is a synonym for 'arising and passing away', or 'birth and destruction'. The Assutavii-sutta 9f the Samyutta-nikiiya presents this empiricist account of change in the statement: "This physical body made up of the four great elements is seen to exist for one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, one hundred or more years. "4 This certainly is an empiricist account of change. It is not a result of metaphysical inquiry or ofany mystical intuition, but a straightforward judgment arrived at by investigation and analysis. It is founded on unbiased thought and has a purely empirical basis. From the fact of the impermanence of the world, it follows that all things are unsatisfactory (dukkha). The word dukkha is rendered variously as 'ill', 'suffering', 'pain', and so on, which may be correct in certain contexts. But in other contexts, for example, where it is said that the five aggregates of grasping (pane' upiidiinakkhandha) are dukkha,5 the term is used in the wider sense of 'unsatisfactory'. That this fact has been overlooked seems to be one of the main reasons why sr me Western interpreters considered Buddhism to be pessimistic . Early Buddhism never denied the satisfaction (assiida, Sk. iisviida, from ii + .Jsvad 'to taste') that man can derive from worldly things. While not denying satisfaction, it emphasized the fact that this satisfaction is generally followed by evil or harmful consequences (iidlnava). This is true for several reasons. The nature of man is such that he craves for eternal or permenent happiness. But the things from which he hopes to derive such happiness are themselves impermanent. Happiness or satisfaction derived from impermanent or ephemeral things would surely be temporary and therefore fall short of his expectation, that is, permanent happiness. Hence his suffering. The things from which he tries to derive satisfaction may CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTENCE 37 [52.14.221.113] Project MUSE...

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