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163 7 Conclusion Implications for the Study of Late Imperial China Inseparably tied to the area’s demography, military institutions, economic structures, ethnic composition, and political dynamics, illicit violence constituted an integral element of the capital region’s social order during the middle Ming period. Given that violent crimes like banditry and highway robbery posed perennial problems in the heart of the Ming empire even during a time of relative peace and prosperity, violence and crime probably loomed more prevalent in late imperial China than many of us may have assumed. This realization has several consequences for our understanding of the period in general. Before considering the implications of this study for late imperial China, let us first briefly review its principal findings. Banditry constituted a recurrent problem in and around the capital of Ming China, Beijing . Gangs of armed riders, often dressed in government-issue armor and bearing imperial weapons, roamed the suburbs of Beijing and its satellite cities, compromising security and severing vital transportation links in the region. The highwaymen preyed on the ceaseless flow of merchants and government functionaries who delivered goods, grain, and taxes to the capital. The flagrant violation of imperial authority in the very shadows of the capital deeply disturbed officials, who ruminated about how much worse the problem was in areas of the empire far from heavily garrisoned Beijing, and it aggravated emperors, who railed against the inefficiency (and worse) of their officials. Banditry in the capital region originated in the area’s demographics, political dynamics, military institutions, and economic structures. The great wealth that supported an enviable lifestyle for some capital residents also attracted a steady supply of brigands and swindlers, who sought to enrich themselves with the silver, goods, and grain bound for Beijing. The capital’s elite, who owed their status, wealth, and influence to the dynasty, were also tied to less-exalted elements of society through a variety of illicit activities. The relatively dense state presence 164 Conclusion in the capital region, with its overlapping layers of jurisdiction and influence , created administrative interstices in which men of force found ample room to exercise their particular talents. The scores of imperial garrisons stationed in and around Beijing, intended for the dynasty’s defense against enemies both from within and without, also figured prominently in the region’s chronic problems with brigandage, as underemployed and lightly supervised soldiers took up highway banditry, extortion, and violent service on behalf of capital elites. This study has attempted to illuminate a fluid world, where shadowy patronage networks, violence (actual and threatened), and crime were an accepted part of life, figuring in the political, social, and economic strategies of a wide variety of actors. Violence drew together men —and, one suspects, women—from all levels of society. The curious meeting in the spring of 1509 brought together palace eunuchs, local men of force, and the Son of Heaven, who played kickball with members of the imperial bodyguard. While the Martial Ancestor was an unusual emperor, and his brief encounter with men of force was extraordinary, this study has demonstrated that alliances between national and local elites with men of force were in fact far more common than a cursory reading of contemporary documents might suggest. This study’s methodology, assumptions, and conclusions sharply contrast with the most influential work on collective violence during the Ming, James Tong’s Disorder under Heaven. The core of Tong’s book is based on statistical analysis of prefectural gazetteers—that is, histories compiled at an intermediate level of government, more local than the provinces but above the county level. The quality and quantity of gazetteers varied widely during the Ming according to time and place, although in general, far more gazetteers were available for the southern regions of China and in the latter half of the dynasty. Although often rich sources of local information, gazetteers were compiled to satisfy agendas that seldom included detailed discussions of local unrest.1 Further, they often failed to adequately reflect larger institutional contexts within which individual local incidents occurred. This study has drawn extensively from prefectural and county gazetteers, but as noted at the outset, I have found the Veritable Records and the Classified Compendium to be far richer resources, not only in the number of incidents mentioned but also in detail and in contextualization . These two centrally compiled sources often contained detailed information on local events when corresponding local histories were completely silent. Other sources, such as narratives, confessions, and various private...

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